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Prompted by the ascendance of the far right, this thesis reinterprets pertinent aspects of 
Kant's aesthetic philosophy to confront far-right political rhetoric. This aesthetic frame provides 
insights into the shortcomings of a predominant rational-deliberative rhetoric, new understanding 
of the resilience of far-right rhetoric, and imagines a cultivation of more open taste via reflective 
judgment to more effectively challenge this rhetoric and cultivates democratic practices. 
Examining key contemporary discursive examples, philosophy, and rhetorical theory, I first 
argue that (neo)fascism cannot be "fact-checked" out of existence; indifference to traditional 
evidence means those who adhere to far-right politics are antagonistic to anything that 
contradicts what they feel to be true.  
Leaning on Jenny Rice to locate sentimental aesthetics and hardened desire underwriting 
what some designate as the far-right's bullshit, I locate the power of these politics in cultivated 
resentment based in American historical, cultural, and temporal dissatisfactions. From this 
genealogy, I suggest that these dissatisfactions, which atrophy the democratic imagination and 
manifest authoritarian longings, produce dogmatic tastes and feelings that maintain and reinforce 
 
 
themselves. These self-reinforcing dogmatic tastes and feelings help make far-right rhetoric 
resilient.  
To contest this, I propose rhetoric that would cultivate a prejudice for reflective judgment 
in matters of aesthetic and political taste. If brought to engage with rich particulars that are 
difficult to subsume under preconceived convictions, people can become more accustomed to 
consider the specificity of situations. If this becomes habitual, then this habit can provide an 
indirect means of weakening far-right sentiments through greater openness to alterity.     
To locate this possibility within existing far-right sentiments, the author revisits Hannah 
Arendt's examination of Adolf Eichmann. Through this, I locate a fascistic style of reflective 
judgment and empathy. Therefore, I argue this existent way of judging still offers a difficult yet 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapters 
1. INTRODUCTION: A CALL TO AESTHETICS IN AN AGE OF ASCENDANT   
 FAR-RIGHT POLITICS ..................................................................................................... 1 
  An Interpretation of "Aesthetics" ............................................................................ 1 
   The Communicability of Taste .................................................................... 4 
   Taste, Judgment, and Ethics  ..................................................................... 14 
  Genealogical Sketch of the American Far-Right Rhetorical Style ........................ 17 
2. COMMON SENSE IS ALL TOO COMMON: SENSUS COMMUNIS, TASTE, 
AND THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE DELIBERATIVE-RATIONAL  
MODEL OF RHETORIC .................................................................................................. 30 
  An Interpretation of "Far Right" ............................................................................ 32 
  Paranoid Character of Far-Right Rhetoric ............................................................. 36 
  Rational-Deliberative Overconfidence in Facticity ............................................... 40 
   Far-Right Indifference to the Rational-Deliberative  
Idea of Facticity ......................................................................................... 45 
   Fickleness of Facticity ............................................................................... 49 
  The Rhetorical Problem of Sensus Communis  
  as Common Human Understanding ....................................................................... 51
  A Contest of Taste: The Need for Rhetorical Contesting of  




3. APPRECIATING AFFECTIVE ARMOR: SKETCHING AN AESTHETIC 
 DIAGNOSTIC OF THE FAR RIGHT .............................................................................. 59 
  Resilience of Bullshit: Appreciating Far-Right Hardened Desires ....................... 61 
  Historically Habituated Resentment and a Need for Democratic Aesthetic   
  Imagination ............................................................................................................ 67 
An Interpretation of "Resentment" ............................................................ 68 
   Resentment as Habitual ............................................................................. 69 
Atrophy of the Democratic Imagination .................................................... 72 
  Fascinating Fascism: Aesthetic Appeal as "Non-Politically" Political ................. 75 
  Affective Landscapes: Temporal Dissatisfaction and Kant's Modes of  
  Judgment ................................................................................................................ 79 
   An Interpretation of "Affective Landscapes" ............................................ 79 
   Temporal Dissatisfaction ........................................................................... 81 
   A Reconsideration of Kantian Aesthetic Vocabulary for  
Contemporary Politics ............................................................................... 83 
4. CULTIVATING A PREJUDICE FOR REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT:  
IMAGINING AN AESTHETIC ORIENTATION TO RHETORIC TO  
CONTEST THE FAR RIGHT .......................................................................................... 87 
  Reflective Judgment as a Form of Porousness ...................................................... 89 
  Reflective Judgment as an Aesthetico-Political Prejudice and Habit .................... 91 
Particulars to Principles: Imagining the Cultivation of Habits for 




Judging Rich Particulars, Exemplars, and the Feeling of the Feeling for  
Reflective Attitudes ............................................................................................... 96 
5. CONCLUSION: HOW DO FASCISTS DREAM? OR ON THE LIMITS OF 
 REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT ........................................................................................... 104 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY  .......................................................................................................... 115 


















CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION: A CALL TO AESTHETICS IN AN AGE OF ASCENDANT FAR-
RIGHT POLITICS 
An Interpretation of “Aesthetics” 
 In regard to rhetorical projects confronting far-right politics, this work argues that a 
deliberative-rationalistic approach to rhetoric is insufficient, that an attraction to or taste for the 
far-right style contributes to this insufficiency, and that inculcating a taste for reflection within 
aesthetic preferences can open the possibility for undermining rightwing tastes and developing 
new and better ones. Without fully abandoning the traditional notions of rationality, credibility, 
and expertise, I argue for informing and creating rhetoric with taste and feeling as its basis to 
contest the ascendance of anti-democratic and authoritarian politics. My approach considers the 
aesthetic aspects of the far right in particular and in the United States more generally and 
suggests that such aesthetics may be contested.  
 At first glance, it may appear that aesthetics and political rhetoric have little relation to 
each other. What do shape, color, form etc. have to do with the real and pressing political 
questions of the day? Further, some may rightly caution that attention to aesthetic considerations, 
if detached from political concerns, risks being counterproductive to addressing such concerns. 
For example, analyzing the style of “tiki-torch” rallies, the formal qualities of neo-Nazi rituals, 
or the appeals of the imagery of phrases like “build the wall” risks drawing attention away from 
the lived sufferings of others. Rather than engage the symbolic trappings of anti-democratic 
discourses, this political moment demands material change. Indeed, Marx’s famous 11th thesis on 
 
 2 
Feuerbach, “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world, the point is to change it” may 
be applied to this context.1 Criticism must have relevance to improving the world.  
Concerns about the traditional disconnectedness of aesthetic matters from political 
matters in the West are not without warrant. If aesthetic considerations had little relation to 
politics, then it would be inadvisable to engage in aesthetic considerations because they would 
detract from political ones. Yet, by offering a broader and more nuanced consideration of the 
meaning of “aesthetic,” I hope to assuage if not extinguish such concerns. Moreover, I hope to 
display the inexorable link between aesthetic questions, (i.e. questions related to taste, attraction, 
and repulsion), and how people feel, act, and judge politically. I understand aesthetics, ethics, 
and politics to be enmeshed. Through their enmeshed character, I suggest it is possible and 
necessary to tackle far-right authoritarian and resentful politics through encouragement and 
discouragement of particular tastes. For example, Jeremy Engel’s Politics of Resentment 
persuasively describes the relatedness between resentful styles of rhetoric and material and 
political violence.2 Also, at least as important as this is the cultivation of a reflective orientation 
to judgments of taste in general.3 Resorting to reflection when making judgments would, with 
any luck, open individuals to consideration of different tastes. I believe this approach to 
inculcating taste relative to judgment may even lead to “leaving behind” old tastes and adoption 
of new tastes. Such tastes include appreciating the complexities of particular happenings, 
respecting evidence to inform judgments, and valuing changes in one’s thoughts and practices. 
                                               
1 Karl Marx, German Ideology, (London: Electric Book Company, 2000), 170. 
2 Jeremy Engels, The Politics of Resentment, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2015).   
3 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
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Cultivating reflection is a way to cultivate a taste for democratic discourse and practices that 
contest anti-democratic discourse and practices.  
 In this introduction, I discuss the aesthetic dimension of contesting far-right authoritarian 
politics and the need for cultivating a taste for reflection, followed by an outline of the 
subsequent chapters. I describe the terrain of taste following Kant and French philosopher Luc 
Ferry. From them, differences in taste become apparent. Differences in political taste need to be 
addressed, especially when some tastes are contrary to democratic discourse, ethics, and projects. 
The taste for anti-democratic, far-right politics that is prevalent today globally must be contested 
and changed to maintain democratic discourse and politics. With this need to cultivate different 
tastes, I locate the possibility of this through the communicability of taste with others. Discourse 
about taste can change habits by encouraging a reflective attitude. To sketch the complex terrain 
of taste, I then lean on Schiller and Marcuse to describe the understanding of aesthetics that 
informs this project.  
 Working from the communicability of rhetorical tastes, I sketch the rhetorical style of the 
American far right. Following Richard Hofstadter, I interpret this style as “paranoid.”4 I trace a 
history of right-wing paranoia from the beginnings of the United States, through the nomination 
of Barry Goldwater for president, to the contemporary situation. The paranoid right-wing style 
appears immunized against contrary interpretations, contributing to its resilience and impeding 
democratic discourse. To contest this paranoid dogmatic style, I argue the aesthetic appeal of this 
style needs to be challenged through the cultivation of habits of reflective judgment. One must 
                                               




become open to changing tastes for changes to occur. Otherwise, it is too easy to maintain 
existing aesthetic inclinations, disinclinations, and their related politics.   
 
The Communicability of Taste 
Accordingly, if aesthetic considerations are at play in ethical judgments and motivate 
political behavior, then this aspect should be taken into consideration in communicative projects 
hoping to contest the neo-fascist tendencies. Moreover, qualitative political changes appear to 
necessitate changes in existing aesthetic preferences, the creation of new ones – in a word, 
aesthetic education toward more ethical being-in-the-world. More immediately, those who hope 
to contest far-right politics cannot presuppose that their opponents share their own taste for 
democracy. To use contemporary psychoanalyst Adam Phillip’s turn of phrase, many want to 
merely “fit in rather than create the taste by which they might be judged.”5 Applying this to the 
context of this project, this is to say that while it is easier to not engage in differences of political 
and ethical taste, especially when more “solid” questions like those of factuality are already 
difficult enough, it is more risky not to engage in this difficult yet necessary task of cultivating 
taste. When questions of ethico-political taste are insufficiently addressed, the possibility of 
meaningful communication with those whose tastes are problematic is, at best, limited if not 
impossible. To illustrate, it is unlikely that someone who is attracted to a US-Mexico border wall 
could even listen to, let alone be swayed by, “proper” ethical, political, and economic arguments 
against a wall, unless that attraction is contested aesthetically. More generally, without working 
to create the tastes that make possible meaningful reflection, opponents of neo-fascistic politics 
                                               
5 Adam Phillips, “A Mind is a Terrible Thing to Measure,” New York Times, Feb. 26, 2006.  
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cannot even hope to challenge, let alone best, the appeal of such politics for those with 
sympathetic tastes.  
In order to cultivate new tastes and a better form of aesthetic judgment to challenge far-
right politics one must ask, “how might tastes change?” Or, "what are conditions for the 
possibility of changing people’s tastes?" Through experience, we know that people’s tastes do, in 
fact, change. From developing a disgust for saccharine foods when moving from childhood into 
adulthood, through the university student who comes to find the politics of her parents 
distasteful, to the parent who comes to prefer the style of more relaxed and conservative-fitting 
clothing over the eccentric, “fashion-forward,” and tight-fit of their youth, all of these examples 
show that tastes can, and do change.  
Provisionally, an answer lies in the potential to communicate about matters of taste with 
one another. French philosopher Luc Ferry speaks to the challenging, though nevertheless 
possible communication of tastes. He cites Hume’s statement, “The great variety of Taste, as 
well of opinion, which prevails in the world, is too obvious not to have fallen under everyone’s 
observation.”6 This variety of tastes appears to preclude the possibility of communication across 
differences in taste. How can taste be communicated if there are so many differences in taste? 
Does the variety of taste mean that it is futile to engage in discourses of taste? Indeed, popular 
maxims like “to each his own taste,” or as Kant puts this saying, “everyone has their own taste,” 
imply that there is an impasse in conflicts of taste.7 There does not appear to be some proof that 
can compel someone to forfeit his or her tastes in favor of other ones. 
                                               
6 Luc Ferry, Homo Aestheticus: The Invention of Taste in the Democratic Age, trans. Robert De 
Loaiza, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 96.  
7 Kant, Critique of Judgement, 165.  
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In situations where tastes conflict, it is common to lean on the notion of liberal tolerance 
in order to prevent or limit the fallout from these conflicts. Wendy Brown in The Power of 
Tolerance describes this idea and practice:  
The whole idea of [tolerance of another’s practices or beliefs] is that there are individual  
differences – beliefs, habits, tastes, ways of life, desires – that cannot be brokered at a  
rational, reasonable, political, moral level and that do not need to be.8  
Religious tolerance is a classic example of tolerance. Though there are differences between 
Hindus, Buddhists, and Sikhs, tolerance can allow these people to live together. There is no 
“overcoming” of these differences; all Hindus and Sikhs do not need to become Buddhists or 
some amalgamation of the other religions, not all Buddhists and Sikhs need to become Hindus 
and so on. While these differences may not be resolved “at a rational, reasonable, political moral 
level,” they do not need to be resolved for the continuity of a democratic society. In other words, 
for differences that cannot be resolved or overcome through the rational-ethical-political level, 
this conception of toleration can deal with such persistent differences. These differences may 
exist as long as they do not need to be resolved for democratic discourse and politics to continue. 
Tolerance can “smooth out” these differences without having to erase them.  
 But applying Brown’s description of tolerance to conflicts of taste involving the far-right, 
creates a problem. For tolerance to “work,” i.e. handle differences without overcoming them to 
maintain a polity, such differences cannot threaten the foundations of the polity that make 
tolerance possible. Some tastes need to be resolved and cannot be brokered at a rational, 
reasonable, political, moral level. For example, tolerance cannot contain a conflict between a 
                                               
8 Wendy Brown, and Rainer Forst, The Power of Tolerance: A Debate, (New York: Columbia 




taste for democracy, reflection, and evidence-based politics versus a taste for far-right 
authoritarian, dogmatic, and resentment politics. This is a conflict that cannot be brokered at a 
rational-ethical-political level and demands brokering, if not resolution. They are irreconcilable. 
If certain beliefs, habits, tastes, ways of life etc. are dogmatic (i.e. absolutely intolerant of 
differences and equally certain of their way), then deliberative democratic discourses decay.  
This issue has an aesthetic dimension, the repulsion felt by far-right adherents to 
opposing and deliberative discourses. We hear this in attacks on the free-press (disparaging the 
“liberal” or “mainstream” media as “fake news”). The makeup and practice of tolerance need to 
be changed (to be maintained at all?) if it is to handle differences that cannot be brokered by 
deliberative-rationalistic discourse. In his “Repressive Tolerance,” Marcuse suggests “the 
practice of discriminating tolerance . . . shifting the balance between Right and Left by 
restraining the liberty of the Right . . . [thereby] strengthening the oppressed against the 
oppressors,” to address an analogous type of situation.9 Given that forces sympathetic to (if not a 
part of) the far-right hold the levers of governmental power, such a strategy does not seem 
pragmatic, even if desirable. Yet, provisionally, it seems worthwhile to imagine a discriminating 
tolerance that can address conflicts of taste that require brokering but cannot be managed through 
traditional rationalistic-deliberative discourse.   
Related to this “soft spot” of tolerance, the inability to compel others and difficulty in 
communicating cross-aesthetic dispositions should not be confused with an impossibility of 
communication in these matters. Additionally, this does not necessarily mean that everyone has 
                                               
9 Herbert Marcuse, postscript to “Repressive Tolerance,” in A Critique of Pure Tolerance, 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1965). Emphasis Added.   
 
 8 
their own taste and therefore it is impossible to motivate changes in taste.10 Failure to reach 
aesthetic consensus should not be confused with a futility of communicating. Even in 
disagreement, the fact that we can communicate with each other in matters of taste makes 
possible changing (and improving) people’s taste.11 Short of this, it may ease such disagreements 
in taste, where tensions between tastes are deployed democratically instead of dogmatically. 
Indeed, Ferry cites several points in Kant’s Critique of Judgment to point to the communicability 
of taste: that “he [or she] who judges with taste . . . may take his [or her] sentiment to be 
generally communicable,” that “the judgment of taste allows for a ‘general communicability of 
sensation (pleasure, displeasure)’”, and that “one could even define taste as the faculty of 
judgment that makes our feeling about a given representation universally communicable.”12 
Thus, the communicability of taste coincides with the possibility of changing people’s tastes. 
Through discourse with others, it is possible to compare one’s tastes with others, such that one 
might adopt another’s taste. Also, individuals may develop different or new tastes, sentiments, 
and inclinations through the process of discourse.   
 To arrive at a more nuanced understanding of aesthetics to inform conflicts of taste that 
inform political practices, I turn to Marcuse in his Eros and Civilization.13 On the meaning of 
“aesthetics” in the West, Marcuse writes that the term “originally designated ‘pertaining to the 
                                               
10 See Kant, Critique of Judgement, Section 56-57.  
11 It is important to note here that the idea of improving taste is itself an aesthetic evaluation. In 
other words, aesthetic judgments happen within taste; there is not “outside” of taste (in a broad 
sense) from which to judge about matters of taste. However, this is not to say that improving 
taste should mean, “making it more like mine.” The intersubjective character of taste, the ability 
to “check” or “test” one’s taste with and through others seems to be an important element of 
changing and improving people’s tastes.  
12 Ferry, Homo Aestheticus, 96.  




senses’ with stress on their cognitive function.”14 This connotation of “aesthetics” refers to the 
“direct” sensation received by sense-apparatus organs (e.g. eyes). From this interpretation, such 
organs provide the material to be operated upon by the mind or brain. For example, the eyeball 
may sense the wavelength 460-nanometer wavelength that the brain then computes as the color 
blue. One can imagine a similar understanding of ‘aesthetic’ for the tongue tasting sugar that is 
imported by cognition to generate sweetness and so on. These sensations of blue may prompt 
further cognitions, such as the correlation of the color blue with the sky, the sweetness as 
stemming from an apple, or a high pitch with a bird’s song. All of these examples of aesthetics as 
sensation demonstrate a strict separation and ancillary role of aesthetics with perception and 
cognition. From this understanding, they are “lower” faculties because they merely provide the 
material, whether the 460 nanometers of light, sweetness, or high pitch, for a separate (and more 
important) perception and cognition. In essence, understanding aesthetics as sensation distills 
aesthetics down to a “raw,” immediately intuitive, and thoughtless apprehension of phenomena.15  
 However, according to Marcuse, the “raw” notion of aesthetics was nuanced with 
eighteenth-century philosopher Alexander Baumgarten’s philosophical introduction of the term 
proper changing “the meaning [of ‘aesthetics’] from ‘pertaining to the senses’ to ‘pertaining to 
beauty and art.’”16 The latter definition aligns closely with the prevalent understanding of 
aesthetics as separate from questions of politics and the association of aesthetics primarily 
referring to what happens in museums. By shifting aesthetics from the “dumb” ingestion of 
objects to a “higher” appreciation of beauty and art, aesthetics comes to be understood as a more 
                                               
14 Ibid, 180.  
15 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald A. Landes (New 
York: Routledge, 2012).   
16 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 181.  
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significant and meaningful aspect of the human condition. This is because with beauty and art, 
there is a greater exercise of psychical energy expended than in the more passive sense-
perception under aesthetics understood as mere sensation. Correspondingly, aesthetics are 
understood as more active in the perception of phenomena than sensation under the yoke of 
cognition.  
From such an active conception of aesthetics, granting that aesthetics inform political 
convictions and practices, then people are not simply passive in aesthetic practices. Therefore, 
there is some freedom and ability for aesthetic perception to change. The active character of 
aesthetic perception begins to disclose the possibility of changes in taste. For the context of 
contesting the far right, if aesthetics were merely passive and these informed far-right politics, 
then it would be nearly impossible and counterproductive to contest such aesthetics, and would 
mean contesting the far right on the aesthetic terrain would be a dubious tactic at best. However, 
this is not the case with an active conception of aesthetics. Though still difficult, an active 
conception of aesthetics allows for changes in aesthetic perception and taste. In other words, 
people have some agency in their aesthetic relation to others and the world. Thus, applying 
aesthetic agency to contesting far-right politics, the possibility of changing taste stems in part 
from the active character of aesthetics. This agency in aesthetics contributes to the possibility of 
cultivating a taste for reflective judgment, and thereby to the potential for changes in aesthetic 
taste for those sympathetic to far-right and anti-democratic politics.   
 Perhaps most importantly to the project of cultivating a taste for reflection are the rich 
aspects of attraction/repulsion, feeling/sentiment, and creativity that orbit aesthetic phenomenon 
under this updated conception. With art and beauty, something about an object may “draw us in” 
or “push us away.” We may be moved by it. For example, the viewer of Goya’s Saturn 
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Devouring His Son may be repulsed by the grotesque figure of Saturn in the painting. Or, in the 
overtly political realm, the attraction by some to the image produced by “Make America Great 
Again.” As experienced, the viewer does not experience the color wavelengths as raw sensation 
later cognitively derived at. Instead, the sensation is active. It immediately is taken up as 
perception and judgment with the image. Thereby, aesthetics is moved into a prominent aspect of 
the human condition.  
 More nuances are available yet under the umbrella of aesthetics. While aesthetics is 
clearly more than “mere sensation” offered in the first interpretation of the term, this does not 
mean it should be vague such that “everything is aesthetic” or is unbounded. In his Letters on 
The Aesthetic Education of Man, Schiller describes the term “aesthetic” as “much abused 
through ignorance.”17 Accordingly, he provides a means of understanding the depth of the term 
without subsuming it underneath other human faculties. Nor does he make it so vacuous that it 
could apply to everything.    
 Toward this, Schiller denotes four different aspects of phenomena—the physical, 
logical/rational, moral/ethical, and the aesthetic.18 These categories should be interpreted as a 
means of understanding, not to imply that these categories are strictly separated from each 
other.19 While sustenance can be physically satisfying, “food for thought” logically satisfying, 
                                               
17 Friedrich Schiller, Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, trans. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson 
and L. A. Willoughby (New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1993), FN 145.  
18 Ibid, FN 146.  
19 From this understanding of aesthetics, aesthetics are involved with the physical, logical, and 
ethical realms. Put differently, they are related but not reducible to physical, logical, and ethical 
considerations. For example, the style and attractive or unattractive character of food plays a part 
in how agreeable or disagreeable it is to us. This can influence how healthy our physical diet is. 
If someone is attracted to unhealthy food and repulsed by healthy food, then they are more likely 




and good character ethically satisfying, “the sheer manner of [someone’s] being” can be 
aesthetically satisfying.”20 In other words, being attracted to, repulsed by, or indifferent to the 
style or appearance of another constitutes an aesthetic judgment of them.  
Related to the aesthetic interlacing with the physical, logical, and ethical dimensions of 
existence, there are different ways of “taking up” each of these aspects of being. Some of these 
ways are better or worse than others. Physically, our diets may be healthier or less healthy. There 
is a multiplicity of ways to be physically healthy and unhealthy. Rationally, we may have better 
or worse consistency in understanding. Different people understand and enact logic differently.  
Some of us may be more or less ethical than another and understand ethical imperatives 
differently. And with regard to aesthetics, there are different tastes and ways of tasting, some 
better and some worse than others. With difference, gradation, and better/worse manifestations in 
each of these phenomenal categories, Schiller notes, “there is an education to health, an 
education to understanding [logic], an education to morality [ethics], an education to taste and 
                                                                                                                                                       
In other words, if one has distaste for what is healthy, it is more difficult and less likely that they 
will be healthy. 
 Logic and aesthetics are also interrelated. Some note an appeal of logic is its conciseness 
and elegance of form. Further, there is attractiveness for some toward consistency that logical 
thinking (at least) purports to uphold. Others are frustrated by the rigidity and sometime 
unforgiving demands of adhering to logical constraints. These are examples of aesthetic 
judgments about logic; there is a taste or distaste, feelings, and pleasure/displeasure, and stylistic 
evaluations of this phenomenal aspect.   
Finally, a similar relationship holds true for aesthetics and ethics. This is the most 
pertinent relationship for this project. A part of judging whether something is right or not is its 
coalescence with one’s taste. What individuals believe is ethical is also appealing. Reciprocally, 
there is distaste, even disgust for what individuals find unethical or wrong. In sum, what people 
find good is also aesthetically attractive, what they find bad is aesthetically repulsive.  
Compare with Critique of Judgement Section 5. Plato’s equation of the beautiful and the good. 
“If acts are beautiful, then they are good…,” See Plato, Gorgias, trans. W.C Helmbold, 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill Educational Publishing, 1952), 42.   
20 Ibid.  
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beauty.”21 Aesthetic taste may be improved (or degraded). Indeed, we may refer to such a 
cultivation of taste with Schiller as an aesthetic education.  
From this explanation, taste can be considered an aspect of aesthetics. In addition to 
feelings of attraction and repulsion, individuals are neither wholly active nor passive in their 
taste. They cannot just choose whatever taste they would like, as if one could “just decide” what 
they are inclined and disinclined toward. Nor are they bound to whatever are the predominant 
tastes inherited by their community. In sum, given that aesthetics inform the physical, logical, 
and ethical, this active-passive character of aesthetics has implication for all of these phenomenal 
aspects.  
The pleasure/pain and appetitive/desirous aspects of aesthetic phenomena are important 
for understanding the “pull” or draw of the aesthetic dimension of politics. Authoritarian styles 
seem to be desirable to and produce pleasure for their audience. Therefore, exploring the place of 
aesthetic pleasure seems to offer a richer account of far-right politics. In Marcuse’s interpretation 
of aesthetics, then, he leans on the German sinnlichkeit “to connote instinctual (especially 
sexual) gratification as well as cognitive sense-perceptiveness and representation [sensation].”22 
From this interpretation, the sensation itself is always-already entwined with its “accompanying” 
pleasure or pain. Sensation and the feeling of sensation are phenomenally already “linked up.” 
Marcuse denotes this aesthetics as “sensation plus affections” where the plus indicates a pre-
established and preconnected “link” (sensation and affection at once), rather than a procedural 
process (first sensation, then affection). Sensation, pleasure/pain, and affect are experienced 
                                               
21 Ibid. Emphasis Added. 
22 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 182. Emphasis Added.  
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simultaneously and “tied up” to each other. From this conception of affect and pleasure co-
constituting aesthetics, one can better appreciate the complexity of the aesthetic terrain. 
To summarize, this above description understands aesthetics as concerned with taste, 
feeling, attraction/repulsion, an active understanding of sensation, and pleasure/displeasure. With 
this description of aesthetics, the relation to democratic ethics and projects in general, and the 
contemporary American political context, in particular, may be sketched. From the above 
understanding of aesthetics, the ties to questions of ethics and politics may be taken up. Kant’s 
description of the relatedness of the beautiful and human beings offers a germane entry point. By 
showing that kinship between human beings and aesthetics, this will pave the way to reaching a 
sense of aesthetic ethics for politics in general and the contemporary situation in particular. If we 
presuppose that ethics is entwined into the human condition and understand that aesthetics is 
similarly so, then aesthetics also has a relation to ethics.                                          
Taste, Judgment, and Ethics 
Kant elegantly writes, “beauty has purport and significance only for human beings, i.e. 
for beings at once animal and rational (but not merely for them as rational beings . . . but only for 
them as both animal and rational).”23 In this passage, Kant describes aesthetics as akin to the 
human condition. He does not privilege either the traditionally rational aspects of human beings 
(e.g. logic, factuality, knowledge), or the traditionally animal or instinctual aspects (e.g. 
sensuousness, pleasure/pain, appetite). Instead, the animal and the rational are both understood as 
parts of being human. They are both appreciated. More radically, they are never wholly separate, 
distinct, or in mere interchange with each other. Given that animality and rationality are both 
present or “play out” in human beings, then it seems more plausible that they co-constitute each 
                                               
23 Kant, Critique of Judgement, 41. Emphasis Added.  
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other than that they are independent of each other. While delineating these aspects of human 
beings may be helpful for understanding each part, the interplay and entanglement of the two are 
needed for a more holistic approach.  
A holistic approach is necessary because it enables understanding and contestation of far-
right politics. How one understands the character of human beings impacts the character of the 
rhetorical approaches to contest such politics. Treating those sympathetic to far-right politics as 
simply misguided in their rationality, as I argue below, operates from a misunderstanding of 
those sympathetic to the far right and the general character of the human condition. Such a 
misunderstanding will likely produce an ineffective contestation of these anti-democratic forces.    
The same holds true for the character of aesthetics. Classically, questions of aesthetics 
tended to privilege rationality (e.g. primarily objective and universal imperatives of taste) or 
animality (e.g. primarily sentimental and individual/subjective feeling of taste).24 In contrast, a  
holistic view of aesthetics yields to neither privileged tendency without rejecting the truth of 
either. This Kantian-influenced approach to aesthetics that I adopt recognizes that aesthetics is 
not simply akin to either rationality or animality. It is both at once. Therefore, beauty, and 
aesthetics more generally, has purport and significance for human beings because we are akin to 
them; aesthetics and human beings are simultaneously animal and rational.   
Admittedly, Kant draws too sharp a division between animality and rationality, and 
understands aesthetics as only applicable to human beings. Nonetheless, this moment offers a 
glimpse at the aesthetic dimension of human beings, and consequently, at the ethical implications 
of aesthetics for politics. To reinterpret Marcuse, then, this understanding of aesthetics and 
                                               
24 See Ferry Chapter 2 and 3 in Homo Aestheticus.  
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ethics, “bases morality [ethics] on a sensuous [aesthetic] ground.”25 This is not to say that ethics 
should be subsumed underneath aesthetics. There are things that may be attractive that are also 
understood as unethical, and things that are unattractive that are also understood as ethical.26 For 
example, one’s attraction to nationalistic rhetoric and repulsion for immigrants alone do not 
make these positions ethical. However, such attractions and repulsion do seem to inform ethical 
judgments. The attraction to nationalism and repulsion toward immigrants likely inform one’s 
feeling that nationalism is good and immigrants are bad. 
Generally speaking, aesthetics as taste, wedded with inclination, feeling, and pleasure 
seems to be a major factor in ethical thinking and behavior. Although taste does not dictate 
ethics, what individuals find pleasing, in a broad sense, tends to align with their ethics. In other 
words, one takes up the ethical thinking, feeling, and acting that one does because one is 
attracted to those ethical postures. Conversely, one often finds something unethical because one 
is disgusted or repulsed by that thing. In essence, there is aesthetic judgment and preference at 
play in ethical evaluations and decisions.  
As a result, contestation of unethical politics does not occur in a completely “pure” or 
“rational” ethical realm. There is an aesthetic dimension to rightwing, anti-democratic politics. 
For example, hearing the chant “build that wall” enthralls some while it disgusts others. The 
feeling itself, i.e. the taste of these words, and one's pleasure or displeasure with this image, play 
a part in whether one thinks this policy goal is good or bad. Therefore, if aesthetic judgments are 
a part of the ground for ethical evaluation and political preferences and behavior, then the 
                                               
25 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 190.  
26 Oscar Wilde’s Picture of Dorian Gray is a prime example of some of the consequences of 
aesthetic attraction to what is unethical. In this novel, the protagonist’s attraction to beauty 
without regard for the ethical consequences leads to his demise.   
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problem of ethicality as it relates to political taste in a democratic society is that there is an 
attraction to what is ethically repulsive to some and a repulsion to what is ethically attractive to 
others. Authoritarian adherents are attracted to what is ethically repulsive pro-democratic 
individuals and vice versa. Conflicts of taste compose the political terrain. Different tastes and 
approaches to taste (e.g. reflective, tolerant, dogmatic, indifferent) seem to be, and often are 
irreconcilable. Someone who finds the image of a border wall beautiful does not share the same 
taste as someone who finds it ugly.   
Genealogical Sketch of the American Far-Right Rhetorical Style 
If we are to aesthetically critique and contest neo-fascistic rhetoric, then it is important 
that we recognize that it is not an apparition that has spontaneously appeared from nowhere. As 
Naomi Klein plainly puts it, “Trump is not a rupture at all, but rather the culmination—the 
logical end point— of a great number of dangerous stories our culture has been telling us for a 
very long time.”27 The sentiments that have more or less been status quo have let fester, laid the 
foundation, if not actively cultivated the rhetoric, culture, and politics that we now live in. This is 
not new, yet is not just the mere repetition of resentments of the past.28 
Therefore, it is important to sketch some of the key stylistic features of the far right. This 
will help provide a basis in the subsequent chapters as to why the predominant contestations of 
this rhetoric are insufficient, what its attractiveness for its audience is, and how it might be better 
contested. Toward this, I rely on twentieth-century American historian Richard Hofstadter’s 
classic 1964 essay, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics.”29 He provides a historical account 
                                               
27 Naomi Klein, No is Not Enough, (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2017), 257.  
28 See Lawrence Grossberg, Under The Cover of Chaos: Trump and the Battle for the American 
Right, (London: Pluto Press, 2018). 
29 Hofstadter, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics.”  
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of the characteristics of various far-right impulses in the United States, which dispels the idea 
that current far-right politics are unprecedented. Then I move to Hannah Arendt’s Origins of 
Totalitarianism and Theodor Adorno’s “Freudian Theory and The Pattern of Fascist 
Propaganda” to provide a modernist interpretation of a fascistic political style.30 Finally, I 
consider the contemporary features of neo-fascism with political theorist Jodi Dean’s Democracy 
and Other Neoliberal Fantasies and cultural studies scholar Lawrence Grossberg’s Under The 
Cover of Chaos.31   
Hofstadter defines a paranoid style to far-right politics. By this, he is referring to “the use 
of paranoid modes of expression by more or less normal people that makes [this] phenomenon 
significant.”32 As a historian, his writing was prompted by the rise of Barry Goldwater’s securing 
of the 1964 Republican presidential nomination, and a political style that Grossberg 
retrospectively notes as an “affective tone of the movement,” to seek the historical context and 
antecedents for this happening. He argues that this paranoid style of Goldwater is an “old and 
recurrent phenomenon in our public life which has been frequently linked with movements of 
suspicious discontent.”33 Indeed, Hofstadter traces this from the anti-Masonic movement of the 
early nineteenth century, through anti-Jesuit and Catholic sentiments persisting into the twentieth 
century, to McCarthyism and anti-Communist attitudes of the Cold War.34 One can imagine this 
                                               
30 Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, (New York: Harcourt Inc., 1976). Theodor 
Adorno, “Freudian Theory and The Pattern of Fascist Propaganda,” in The Culture Industry: 
Selected Essays On Mass Culture, ed.  J. M. Bernstein (London: Routledge, 2001).  
31 Jodi Dean, Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left 
Politics, (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2009). Grossberg, Under The Cover of Chaos: 
Trump and the Battle for the American Right.  
32 Hofstadter, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics,” 77.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid, 78-81.  
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line extended to the present via the resentments of the Tea Party exemplified in figures like Sarah 
Palin and Ted Cruz.35  
Through this historical trajectory, there are key common threads to a rightwing paranoid 
style. Of the anti-Masonic movement of the early eighteenth-century, Hofstader notes “an 
obsession with conspiracy” and an “apocalyptic and absolutist framework in which. . . hostility 
was commonly expressed.”36 This is eerily similar to the conspiratorial and absolutist character 
of many on the far right (par excellence Alex Jones). Nearly everything is understood as driven 
by conspiracy, and there is almost nothing that could challenge an adherent’s certainty in their 
convictions.  
This eeriness continues with the continuity of a feeling of loss among these political 
adherents. Indeed, during Trump’s inauguration and electoral victory speeches, he claims, “The 
forgotten men and women of the country will be forgotten no longer.”37 He recognizes and 
validates their perception that they have been “getting a raw deal.” Anticipating this, Hofstadter 
observed that the modern right wing, “feels dispossessed: [they believe] America has been 
largely taken away from them and their kind, though they are determined to try and repossess it . 
. ..”38 In tandem with absolutist and conspiratorial tendencies, this feeling of loss is difficult to 
contest, even if untrue. This is because absolute beliefs and conspiratorial “evidence” necessarily 
reinforce each other; one does not attach oneself to conspiracies unless they are already 
                                               
35 Grossberg, Under The Cover of Chaos, 71.  
36 Hofstadter, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics,” 79.  
37 Donald Trump, "The Inaugural Address," White House, January 20, 2017,  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address/ 
38 Hofstadter, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics,” 81. 
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sympathetic to them and already convinced of their truthfulness.39 This phenomenon of 
“find[ing] conspiracy to be betrayal from on high” can be seen in talk of the so-called deep state 
and wanting to “drain the swamp.”40  
Related to the absolute conviction of conspiracy is the far-right understanding of what 
evidence means and the function it serves. In contrast to what some may argue, the far right does 
have concern for evidence, but not in the same way of traditional conventions like falsifiability 
of evidence and for use in argumentation toward persuasion. Hofstadter describes this orientation 
toward evidence: “the paranoid seems to have little expectation of actually convincing a hostile 
world, but he can accumulate evidence in order to protect his [or her] cherished convictions from 
[others].”41 In short, the paranoid style does not engage in good faith from a more rationalistic 
understanding of persuasion. Evidence is not for persuading others as much as it is for preventing 
the possibility of being persuaded.  
Given this ambivalence toward persuasion of others in a traditional sense, there are at 
least two important notes to gather about the paranoid style of the far right. First, is the meaning 
of “evidence.” Conventionally, evidence is sought to create, inform, and potentially modulate a 
position. Evidence may be disputed, but once agreed upon, it can potentially become a 
motivating factor in changing one’s attitudes. Following this model, someone may be skeptical 
of climate change, but then be swayed after seeing photographic evidence of glacial melting or 
increased carbon density readings in an Arctic ice sample.  
                                               
39 This connects with Arendt’s description of the greater simplicity, consistency and cohesion of 
a totalitarian worldview in contrast to an understanding of events as ambiguous, at times 
contradictory, and complex. In my view, the latter understanding better reflects the character of 
events. However, the appeal of the former should not be underestimated. Arendt, Origins of 
Totalitarianism, 351-354. 
40 Hofstadter, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics,” 81. 
41 Ibid, 86.  
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In contrast, evidence means something different within a paranoid style. Rather than 
being a means of informing one’s position, instead, evidence almost exclusively serves one’s 
pre-established attitudes. From this approach, evidence and what one feels and believes to be true 
almost never come into conflict. The evidence of a paranoid style reflects one’s beliefs, this 
evidence does not challenge or inform them in good faith (i.e. where the evidence can prompt a 
reevaluation and potential change in one’s convictions). For example, Hofstadter cites the retired 
candy manufacturer Robert H. Welch’s purported knowledge that President Eisenhower was a 
communist “based on an accumulation of detailed evidence so extensive and so palpable that it 
seems to put this conviction beyond any reasonable doubt,” (Hofstadter dubs Welch as the 
successor to McCarthy’s paranoid style).42 For Welch and his audience, the evidence confirms 
what he already “knows,” it does not constitute knowledge. This is to say that the evidence 
appears conclusive to a paranoid style because it complements their pre-established desires and 
sentiments. 
This type of “evidence” is not aimed to persuade others. It demands acceptance and 
compliance rather than prompting reflection and judgment. Put simply, this alternative evidence 
corresponds to an alternative type of persuasion, one concerned with the maintenance of one’s 
convictions and in-group status.43 Further, if this “evidence” merely serves to maintain and 
reinforce one’s preexisting attitudes, then one must already have this attitude present. Even if 
only latently, this attitude must be present to “take hold” for sympathetic audiences. Once one 
                                               
42 Ibid, 82.  
43 This sense of the word “alternative” alludes to the infamous Kellyanne Conway “alternative 
facts” interview explored in the first chapter. Alternative evidence, facts, and persuasion imply a 
different way of approaching truth, rather than abandonment of truth as such. They believe what 
they are saying relates to the truth. Therefore, rather than this being post-truth, instead, they seem 
to be post-fact and post-reason in the traditional Enlightenment sense of these terms.  
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has become paranoid, then evidence changes its status to upholding paranoid convictions. 
However, paranoid evidence is not persuasive unless one is already amenable to the style. This is 
because those who adhere to a more rational-deliberative notion of evidence are unlikely to be 
persuaded by paranoid evidence. For instance, the forty-fifth president claimed, “In many places 
the same person in California votes many times. They always like to say, 'Oh that's a conspiracy 
theory.' It's not a conspiracy theory. Millions and millions of people and it's very hard because 
the state guards their records." Unless one is already sympathetic to the convictions that the 
president garnered more votes, won the biggest landslide, or is trying to be removed by the “deep 
state” etc., then this evidence is not persuasive.44 Therefore, such evidence cannot create or alter 
attitudes, only maintain and magnify them. For this evidence to have any weight, supportive 
attitudes must already be present.  
This shift in the character and purpose of evidence changes the discursive terrain. Using 
September 11th conspiracy theories for her basis, Jodi Dean in her Democracy and Other 
Neoliberal Fantasies asks if the ascendance of (false) certainty is contributing to conditions that 
“[concern] the possibility for knowledge and credibility.”45 At least as contemporary happenings 
have been playing out discursively, it seems safe to answer in the affirmative. The contradiction 
of climate science in environmental and economic policy is one of many examples of the “brave 
new world” we find ourselves in. Democratic societies in the present moment are wrestling with 
the paradoxical prospect that those with power are increasingly understood to “have the facts” 
and the facts increasingly are understood as aligned with individuals one is are already 
                                               
44 Chris Cilliza, “Donald Trump’s Illegal Voters Fantasy, Part 281” CNN online, last modified 
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sympathetic to. Reformulating Nietzsche’s famous assertion, facts are tailored to interpretations 
that fit one’s preexisting taste, if they are adhered to at all.46 Evidence almost always confirms, 
rather than challenges one’s convictions. It rarely serves as a prompt for or means of reflection in 
judging. 
Moreover, an important aspect of this phenomenon is the maintenance of group character 
and cohesion in what is taken up as evidence and its relationship to affect and understanding. 
Expanding upon Hofstadter’s understanding of paranoid evidence, Dean asks, “what if the so-
called facts circulate tribally, consolidating communities of the like-minded even as they fail to 
impress—or even register to—anyone else.”47 Instead of evidence informing one’s choice of 
group identity, one’s evidence is a de facto indicator of group identity. Under such a “group-
think” approach, people do not read Breitbart News and then become convinced of their 
convictions. People read Breitbart News because they are already sympathetic to or convinced of 
their convictions. They coincide with their perception of the world.  
Taking up the aesthetic aspect of this perception, sympathetic aesthetic tastes can account 
for complementary ways of perceiving others and the world. Extending the above example, one 
reads Breitbart because it is appealing, because of the reader’s attraction to this understanding of 
the world and related sympathetic ways of perceiving the world. In other words, having a similar 
taste, at least as much as the taste “itself,” motivates the attraction. When a friend puts Revolver 
by The Beatles onto the turntable, I am attracted to the fact we have a similar taste for this album 
as much as that we are listening to Revolver. Or, as Arendt puts it, “By communicating one’s 
feelings, one’s displeasures and disinterested delights, one tells one’s choices and chooses one’s 
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trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), 458.  
47 Ibid, 147. Emphasis Added.  
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company [community or group].”48 Complimentary taste appears to be an important part of 
group identity as much as the specific content of group beliefs.    
Accordingly, tastes and beliefs should not only be approached in an epistemic manner. 
The aesthetic-social or intersubjective character of group beliefs need to be confronted to counter 
the far-right paranoid style. Without addressing the feelings and tastes that inform and motivate 
these understandings, oppositional rhetorics will have limited success. This is equally difficult as 
it is necessary. If what one believes to be true is tied with deep anti-reflective or dogmatic group 
taste and feelings, such taste and feelings are essential to who one is. This is to say that such 
attitudes are a part of one’s character and style of being. To reorient far-right aesthetics is to 
reorient who its adherents are. In a sense, it is to encourage them to become different people. 
When what we believe to be true and good is intimately linked with our taste and feelings (i.e. 
our aesthetic comportment), and these are anti-reflective or dogmatic, then changing aesthetic 
attitudes is necessary to motivating changes in what one finds to be true/untrue and good/bad. 
For this change to occur, dogmatic aesthetic attitudes must be confronted; an opening must be 
created to “revise” one’s aesthetic perception if one is to change and if one’s interpretation of 
truth and ethics are to change.  
Aesthetic tastes and feelings of dogmatic groups in general, and far-right groups in 
particular, then, seem to cement group convictions. Concerning September 11th conspiracy 
theories, Dean writes, “The jouissance connecting each fact to another produces certainty as an 
effect—it feels true (we can feel it in our gut).”49 Aesthetics orient people toward understandings 
of truth and goodness. Therefore, the dogmatic convictions of the far right suggest dogmatic 
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aesthetic attitudes; certain feelings lend themselves to certain convictions. For example, 
resentment feels true and righteous for those who are resentful. Thus, if the intuitiveness of the 
far right informs the certainty and dogmatism of their convictions, such intuitions must be 
challenged to undermine this certainty and dogmatism. That is, the aesthetic pull toward these 
politics needs to be undercut and reoriented or changed for a chance of contesting these politics. 
Undercutting dogmatism could provide an opening for different aesthetics to motivate one’s 
politics, different ways of feeling to inform one’s judgments, and different tastes that informs 
one’s attitudes. This opening could clear the way for better aesthetics and ways of judging 
political matters.   
Against the possibility of such an opening, (potentially) supportive attitudes for a 
paranoid far-right political style are present in the American context (at the very least). With 
figures ranging from McCarthy and Goldwater to Palin and Trump, it is clear there is a basis for 
support. As Hofstadter writes: 
Certain religious traditions, certain social structures and national inheritances, certain 
historical catastrophes or frustrations may be conducive to the release of [paranoid] 
psychic energies, and to situations in which they can more readily be built into mass 
movements or political parties . . . American experience[s] [of] ethnic and religious 
conflict have plainly been a major focus for militant and suspicious minds of this sort.50 
Certainly then, under these circumstances there is a vast array of social and cultural material in 
the United States in which to embed such convictions. 
 Rhetorically, this is why discourse disputing or calling into question the evidence of those 
with this paranoid style has limited influence. If one presupposes a traditional understanding of 
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evidence with someone of a paranoid style, then they will be unlikely to break the pattern of 
calcified convictions because evidence for the paranoid style serves to reinforce far-right 
convictions. This is because one must confront the attractiveness of far-right convictions and this 
vicious cycle of “overdetermined” judgment that sustains them if one is to alter attitudes. 
Conversely, there is the sense that far-right claims and evidence are trying to convince others 
who are not already sympathetic to their ideas.       
 There is, then, a double bind. Misunderstanding the meaning and purpose of the evidence 
within far-right rhetoric leaves those who hope to rhetorically contest such politics in a 
precarious situation because they operate on the wrong terrain. Preliminarily, rather than dispute 
or undermine the evidence or claims of a paranoid style, rhetoricians should seek ways to disrupt 
this vicious process of primarily (if not only) seeking and accepting “evidence” that only serves 
to reinforce one’s existing convictions. As a play on the Kantian phrase, I interpret this approach 
to conviction and evidence as a form of overdetermined judgment. While Kant designates 
determinate judgment as presupposing the rule/principle and applying it to the particular case at 
hand, overdetermined judgment finds all particulars to reinforce their universal conviction.51 In 
other words, there is no application of universals to particulars in overdetermined judgment; all 
particulars are believed to adhere to preexisting absolutes, ipso facto in accord with dogmatic 
beliefs. In what Arendt describes as the desire of the masses for consistency, Hofstadter sees 
overdetermined judgment that “produces heroic strivings for evidence to prove that the 
unbelievable is the only thing that can be believed.”52 The unwavering commitment that one is 
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unquestionably and unconditionally right means the far right, as a collective, is almost entirely 
numb to being moved by its opposition.  
Crucially, it is important to note that this way in which convictions are felt is not wholly 
or necessarily counter-factual. This is to say that a paranoid far-right style is indifferent or 
ambivalent about traditional factuality, not antagonistic. For example, while McCarthy’s 
accusations were certainly paranoid, Hofstadter concedes, “In our time an actual laxity in 
security allowed some communists to find a place in governmental circles, and innumerable 
decisions of World War Two and the Cold War could be faulted.”53 That is, McCarthy was not 
simply factually incorrect. His claims could not completely be dubbed false, even if misleading 
and disingenuous from the point of view of his opponents. To use a contemporary example, 
Trump claimed that the United States has “lost, over a fairly short period of time, sixty thousand 
factories in our country” as justification for tariffs against China.54 This number is correct, 
though this does not inherently mean China is the chief cause of this loss or that imposing tariffs 
will solve this problem. Therefore, as discussed in the following chapter, opponents of far-right 
politics cannot merely point out the counter-factual status of the far right. This is because this 
type of evidence is not always false and usually does not aim to persuade opponents. Pointing 
out the counter-factual status will not be enough and is not always possible because some 
paranoid claims correspond to facts.  
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That is why I contend the paranoid style of the far right must be understood as more than 
an epistemological issue. It has powerful aesthetic underpinnings. Hofstadter carefully notes, 
“[This] style has more to do with the way in which ideas are believed than the truth or falsity of 
their content.”55 Their affinity with and attraction to their convictions is a part of far-right 
discourse. Conversely, their aversion to and abhorrence of sentiments that do not align with their 
own fortify them against incursions. These conditions contribute to the difficulty in undermining 
these convictions. The paranoid style is a fully fleshed way of feeling and judging, not a 
temporary mix-up. This suggests an aesthetic approach to contesting the taste for the paranoid 
style, distaste for their opponents, and the overdetermined way of judging itself.   
Taking an aesthetic approach, in this project I consider what contesting the paranoid style 
of the far right might look like from a rhetorical point of view. In the first chapter, I will argue 
that a predominant strand of deliberative-rationalistic rhetoric is insufficient in contesting the 
paranoid style of far-right politics. Contemporary events, such as the infamous “alternative facts” 
interview of Kellyanne Conway will demonstrate that this approach is not working. Informed by 
a nuanced understanding of aesthetics, I criticize these events to display the resilience of far-right 
paranoid style and the impotence of the predominant approach to contesting this style.  
If rational-deliberative discourse is ineffective in contesting far-right political discourse, 
then one must first understand why the paranoid style is resilient to rational-deliberative 
discourse. That is, understanding the symptom is not enough. Understanding that rational-
deliberative discourse is ineffective is necessary for recognizing a need for different rhetorical 
approaches, yet is not enough to develop better approaches. To effectively contest the paranoid 
style, one needs to appreciate the motivations for paranoid style and its consequences. In the 
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second chapter then, I offer dogmatic taste and perception as a major motivating factor in the 
resilience of far-right rhetoric and politics. In a word, the inability of deliberative-discourse to 
contest a far-right paranoid style lies in the aesthetic register. It is not an error in reasoning or 
simply an epistemic issue. Dogmatic taste for neo-fascistic styles and distaste for (left) 
democratic politics contributes to the resilience of far-right politics. I interpret rhetoricians Jenny 
Rice and Jeremy Engels’s ideas about the character of bullshit and resentment to deepen the 
account of paranoid style offered in the introduction. Further, I look to Grossberg’s notion of 
affective landscapes to “round out” an aesthetic account of the far right.  
I argue in the third chapter that the taste for far-right paranoia style requires rhetorical 
contestation if opponents of these politics are to succeed. The resilient distaste for democratic 
politics and taste for authoritarian politics need to be countered. Though difficult, these tastes 
must be tackled. This difficulty stems from an unreflective, even anti-reflective way of judging in 
matters of taste. Therefore, to change tastes, rhetoricians should cultivate a prejudice for 
reflective judgment, habits for addressing the particularity of experience, and a taste for 
wrestling with the complexities of decision-making. Cultivating this orientation, this way of 
feeling about intuitions, could undermine the dogmatic certainty of far-right convictions and 
sentiments. Such an orientation could aesthetically open up those sympathetic to far-right politics 









COMMON SENSE IS ALL TOO COMMON: SENSUS COMMUNIS, TASTE, AND THE 
INSUFFICENCY OF THE DELIBERATIVE-RATIONAL MODEL OF RHETORIC 
 In contesting what we find unacceptable, it naturally follows that one reflexively wants to 
take the most assured method to undermine and best our political opponents. It is commonly held 
that addressing climate change, exorbitant wealth inequality, mass incarceration that 
disproportionately affects minorities, threats of nuclear war, or the specter of terrorism are too 
important to take anything but the safest and most sure route to tackle them. So much is at stake. 
From this conventional, rationalist perspective, these issues are so important, the possibility of 
unquestionable, neutral, and unbiased claims may appear attractive in an increasingly 
questionable, partial, and biased climate. For many of the issues of concern, the problem may 
appear as a lack of knowledge—too many people do not appreciate the rapidity of climate-
change, the breadth of wealth inequality and its social implications, or the scale and 
consequences of systemic racism in the criminal justice system. If the problem with the far right 
is bias and misunderstanding, correcting this by supplying unbiased knowledge might seem 
intuitive. Here, I am talking about the power to persuade from facts and its twin of common 
sense—the silver bullet that even our worst opponents must submit to, that even the most 
outrageous claims must pay homage to. From the rhetorical approach that I designate as 
“rational-deliberative,” the careful and correct assemblage of these certainties will, with enough 
effort, make us “come to our senses” and even “see the light of reason.” As John Adams said, 
channeling the Enlightenment air of rationality, “Facts are stubborn things; whatever may be our 
wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passion, they cannot alter the state of facts and 
evidence.” In true juridical fashion, a rational-deliberative approach believes that facts 
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communicated to impartial minds must necessarily be judged correctly and fairly. People’s 
wishes, inclinations, and passions must (and will) yield to the facts and evidence.  
 Yet, given the character of contemporary politics and how “mad” they are, there seems to 
be reason to put this proposition into question. Faith in the rhetorical potency of facts warrants 
examination. If facts are so assured, how could we be where we are? How could such 
transparent, misleading, and seemingly dismissible lies be so effective in directing public 
discourse? The current flight from reason not only suggests putting into question the 
persuasiveness of facts in public discourse, but there also seems to be cause to consider how 
effectively facts appeal, affect, and move us. Said differently, what is the relationship between 
facts and wishes, inclinations, and passions? We should take seriously how or even whether facts 
make people reflect, reconsider, and reorient ourselves. The election and presidency of Trump 
should make us meaningfully consider how facts are judged, how their coincidence or conflict 
with public tastes impacts if and how they are taken up, and their relationship to ways of seeing 
(or not seeing) others and the world.     
Accordingly, this chapter will explore the reasons and implications of questioning faith in 
facticity. Building on Hofstadter’s description of the paranoid style of the far right, I describe 
what I mean by “far right” and establish the applicability of this description for the contemporary 
far right. Through a variety of discursive examples, I will critique what I call a rational-
deliberative approach and argue that this approach to rhetoric has proved insufficient in 
confronting the rise of far-right politics. Specifically, I look to an overestimation of the power of 
facticity in persuasion and a misunderstanding of the character of sensus communis (or common 
aesthetic sense) as reasons for this insufficiency. When faced with a paranoid style that is 
indifferent to facticity, and has different rhetorical tastes, I suggest such rational-deliberative 
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rhetoric underappreciates the importance of aesthetic taste and attitudes in the constitution of 
how groups think and act politically. Provisionally, instead of aiming to compel and dictate the 
far-right into compliance through evidence and common sense, opponents should woo and court 
them aesthetically—should cultivate a taste for reflection that can inculcate a taste democratic 
politics. This will setup a consideration of an aesthetically oriented understanding of the far right 
and of rhetorics that might more effectively contest these politics in the succeeding chapter. 
An Interpretation of “Far Right”  
To argue that far-right politics have a paranoid style and that this is insufficiently 
contested by the predominant rational-deliberative rhetoric, I first need to describe who and what 
I am referring to as “far right.” Defining the far right can provide a basis for understanding and 
differentiating between them and other political forces. However, too strict of a definition would 
risk too sharply delineating who is and is not far right. Overly strict definitions will likely 
underappreciate the amorphous, dynamic, and changing character of these politics. Appreciating 
the spectrum of support and sympathy for the far right is also important in understanding these 
politics so they may be opposed. Thus, it is difficult and perhaps undesirable to “pin down” the 
meaning of “far right” in the context of the United States.  
Still, a sketch of these politics is helpful for understanding them. What I refer to as “far 
right” and sometimes as “neofascism” is more popularly dubbed as the so-called alternative right 
or “alt right.” I do not use this term. As Grossberg describes, “the label ‘alt-right’ strikes me as 
self-serving: not only does it serve to cover the differences. . . but in the end, it serves as cover 
for the most hateful (neo-Nazi) versions of reactionary conservatism.”56 It appears that the term 
“alt right” serves to “soften the edges,” even “airbrush” the viciousness of these politics. Like 
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any political label, “far right” cannot encapsulate all of the differences between people who 
subscribe to these politics. Yet, far right seems to better describe the reactionary character 
because it challenges the normalization of these politics. Therefore, this term can serve as a 
pointer for the common ascendant political orientation on the Right in American politics.  
Therefore, describing the two major factions of the far right provides the groundwork for 
an analysis of their paranoid style. Indeed, rather than providing a definition or set of maxims, 
Grossberg argues, “only by laying [the different fractions of far-right politics] out separately . . . 
one can see the frightening commonality operating in their political visions. 57 Following 
Grossberg, the first major fraction is “post-libertarian” as exemplified in Allun Bokhart and Milo 
Yiannopoulos’ so-called alt-right manifesto.58 They often troll with their “meme-team” (e.g. 
spreading false-news). Their activities “are almost always racist and misogynist” and “adopt 
many of the discourses of white nationalism and ‘white identity.’”59  
A key aspect of the “post-libertarian” style for my project is their encouragement of 
paranoia. Grossberg describes a primary motivation of this far-right political fraction as 
“want[ing] to drive people crazy, make them paranoid, and unsure what is going on, create panic 
and above all, chaos.”60 I relate this nurturing of the conditions for paranoia with Hofstadter’s 
description of the paranoid style of far-right politics. By aiding a chaotic political atmosphere, 
they encourage the conditions of a correspondingly paranoid style to potentially appear 
attractive.  
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Ironically, Bokhart and Yiannopoulos openly state that the predominant rational-
deliberative rhetoric of their opponents will not alter their attitudes or sureness of their 
convictions. In their manifesto, they write, “The Left can’t language-police and name-call [the 
far right] away . . . and the Right can’t snobbishly dissociate itself from them and hope they go 
away either.”61 While it is a hasty generalization to argue the Left is censoring language rather 
than more often pointing out the racist and sexist beliefs of the far right, this still displays the 
resilience of far-right politics to any opposition. When most opposition from the Left is reduced 
to language policing or name-calling, this displays the resilience of these politics to the 
conventional opposition. Though likely not intended by Bokhart and Yiannopoulos, I interpret 
this to say that predominant, left-leaning rhetorics are largely ineffective. Truly, the conventional 
playbook will not do (and they are even telling us so!).  
Grossberg's second fraction appears more akin to overt neo-fascism. He describes them 
as “directly connected to earlier groups excluded by the New Right” and as taking up “forms of 
white supremacism and anti-Semitism.”62 Figures like Steve Bannon and Richard Spencer 
exemplify the tendencies of this fraction. They claim the work of twentieth-century Italian fascist 
Julius Evola as their “intellectual” foundation.63 Grossberg explains Evola’s political aim: 
“Revolution [that] cannot seek to simply change or undermine or even escape the disaster that is 
modernity, it must . . . ‘blow everything up.’”64 It is safe to say that such motivations inform 
their rhetorical style. Why then would they adhere to the predominant rational-deliberative 
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rhetorical orientation, in part a product of the Enlightenment world they want to ‘blow up,’ when 
they are actively anti-Enlightenment and favor a return to a pre-Enlightenment world?   
Perhaps most importantly, I include major elements of the (formerly?) New Right 
Republican Party in this sketch of far-right politics. Some might object to this. They might argue 
it is unfair to place “rank-and-file” Republicans as “far right” because they are traditionally 
understood as “center right.” By lumping together a sizable portion of Republicans with the far 
right, such a move also risks overestimating the actual rhetorical and political power of the far 
right. As the shock for many of the 2016 electoral results displays, even if these concerns are 
sincere, there is greater risk in underestimating the appeal of the far right to the American people 
than in overestimating it. Beyond pragmatically erring on the side of caution, were one unwilling 
to label sizable portions of the GOP as far right, such unwillingness would misapprehend the 
stoking of resentments already occurring within the New Right. It would not recognize the 
ascendant and increasingly dominant status of “Trumpist” candidates that is part of the far right's 
ascendancy (e.g. Roy Moore’s defeat of his New Right opponent in the Alabama primary 
contest). It would ignore the “falling in line” of most Republicans with the President and the 
unpopularity and defeats of those who do criticize or challenge this agenda (e.g. Senator Flake of 
Arizona and South Carolina Representative Mark Sanford).65    
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Paranoid Character of Far-Right Rhetoric 
 Accordingly, I draw upon discourse from the above fractions of the far right to display 
their paranoid style. I provide a number of brief examples to point toward the paranoid style as a 
general phenomenon on the far right. Senator Orrin Hatch’s commentary about whether to fund 
the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) displays the paranoid style. In an exchange 
with a colleague about whether to provide sufficient funding for the program, he states, “We’re 
going to do CHIP . . . I happen to think CHIP has done a terrific job for people who really 
needed the help.”66 Here, he seems to express support for this program. He even brags, “I 
invented [CHIP]. I was the one who wrote it.”67 Yet, in the next breath, he puts this support into 
question: “I have a rough time spending billions and billions and trillions of dollars to help 
people who won’t help themselves—won’t lift a finger.”68 After seeming to express support for 
this program, he insinuates that those who benefit from CHIP funding are undeserving; they are 
responsible for the nation’s financial woes. Then he quickly reiterates his “support” for CHIP: 
“[I do not] know anyone here who is not going to support CHIP when we bring it up and I am 
one who wants to make sure we bring it up.”69  
Here, Hatch displays the suspicious and chaotic character of the paranoid style. He 
presents a conspiracy of “the liberal philosophy that has created millions of people. . . who 
believe everything they ever are or hope to be depends upon the federal government.” He 
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matches Hofstadter’s characterization exactly, an “absolutist framework in which . . . hostility 
[is] commonly expressed” by saying “it’s pretty hard to argue against these comments” of liberal 
conspiracy.”70 This matter-of-fact belief presents itself as if “it is an ascertained fact,” 
emblematic of paranoid style.71   
Or, look to Sheriff Joe Arpaio, (whose particularly notorious tent city he jokingly 
compared to a concentration camp).72 Arpaio was convicted for “criminal contempt related to his 
hard-line tactics going after undocumented immigrants,” but was later pardoned by the 
President.73 At the time of writing, he is running in the Arizona Republican primary for the 
vacant U.S. Senate seat. In January, 2018, the President announced he was willing to consider a 
deal concerning the reinstatement of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a 
repealed program that allowed for undocumented immigrants brought by their parents to remain 
in the country.74 Despite Arpaio’s so-called tough stance on immigration, desiring to deport 
undocumented immigrants, he did not publicly disagree with the President. Instead, the former 
Sheriff expressed his alignment with the President, despite the potential ideological and policy 
inconsistency: “If I was a senator now and the President really wanted this, I probably would 
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back him up on it because I really do respect his judgment.”75 It does not matter that Arpaio has 
previously denounced DACA; the paranoid conviction of support for the leader cannot be 
undermined with evidence of ideological inconsistency.  This aligns with Hofstadter’s paranoid 
characteristic of “protect[ing] cherished convictions from [inconsistency and contradiction].”76 
Indeed, Arendt notes that far-right propaganda is immune to ideological inconsistency and 
contradiction by any incongruity “being explained . . . as a ‘temporary tactical maneuver.’”77 
Arpaio can simply “brush off” this contradiction with Trump through his trust in Trump’s 
judgment as a mere tactic for later concessions (e.g. a southern border wall, future immigration 
restrictions, deportations etc.). The former Sheriff’s support of the President, even in areas where 
there “should” be disagreement, displays the resilience of paranoid character. It is futile to try to 
undermine this style through pointing out logical inconsistencies and/or contradictions.  
Such resilience against inconsistency and contradiction is also apparent in the paranoid 
style of GOP U.S. Representative Paul Gosar and Senate candidate Roy Moore. They both 
deflect criticism and opposition through raising the specter of conspiracy. For instance, when 
asked about the white supremacist rally in Charlotesville, Gosar suggested the rally was a false 
flag operation “maybe that was created by the left.”78 He suggests that “left-wing” billionaire 
George Soros may have funded the neo-Nazi rally. Moore mirrors this conspiratorial thinking by 
claiming the multiple allegations of sexual misconduct against him stem from a political 
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conspiracy.79 In both cases, there is no evidence, or more precisely, merely a paranoid style of 
evidence, to support these claims. Recalling Dean, its paranoid “evidence” derives from that the 
conspiracy “feels true (we can feel it in our gut).”80 Or, as Arendt writes, “they do not trust their 
eyes and ears but only their [paranoid] imaginations.”81 The paranoid imagination provides 
fantasies to prompt their (and their audiences’) eyes and ears to see, hear, and believe in 
conspiracy. 
Given its resonance with fascistic rhetoric from the twentieth-century, the President’s 
rhetoric about immigrants is quite chilling in its conspiratorial paranoia: “[Democrats] don’t care 
about crime and want illegal immigrants, no matter how bad they may be, to pour into and infest 
our Country.”82 Many rightfully have pointed out the use of this metaphor previously used by the 
National Socialist regime. However, one should not stop at this apt comparison. To appreciate 
the danger of this rhetoric to democracy precisely, one needs to appreciate the paranoid style and 
aesthetics of this statement.83 By comparing immigrants with an infestation, this is likely 
motivated by and prompts disgust and repulsion to the tastes of sympathetic audiences. The 
affective charge of the verb “infest” seems to engage at the level of taste (rather than a “logical” 
evaluation). Such taste-driven evaluation lends itself to Hofstadter’s apocalyptic tone of the 
paranoid style; the language of parasitic infestation portrays the United States as threatened by 
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undesirable and dangerous others. Indeed, this paranoid disgust stems from “an imagination 
[that] ha[s] been inflamed” by paranoid fantasy with effects that are all-too real.84    
Rational-Deliberative Overconfidence in Facticity  
The rationalist-deliberative approach to contesting the far right is overconfident in its 
understanding of the persuasive power of facts. Typically, this approach operates as if correcting 
counter-factual claims with facts will undermine such claims and motivate changes in political 
thinking, acting, and feeling. Such an approach to rhetoric also appears with a “matter-of-fact” 
attitude; it does little to appeal to those sympathetic to counter-factual claims. This style 
insufficiently appeals to those ambivalent, hesitant, or hostile to its claims. It often does little 
more than assuage those who are already sympathetic. To demonstrate, I look to some 
contemporary examples to show how “compelling” facticity is understood and taken up in order 
to undermine the counterfactual character of (far)right claims and dissuade sympathetic 
audiences.  
An illustrative example of this is present in a CNN advertisement entitled “This is an 
Apple.” It depicts a red apple on a white background and is narrated with the following: 
This is an apple. Some people might try and tell you that it’s a banana. They might 
scream banana, banana, banana over and over and over again. They might put banana in 
all caps. You might even start to believe that this is a banana. But it’s not. This is an 
apple.85 
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The advertisement concludes with “Facts First” written in black for several seconds, followed by 
a brief flash of CNN’s logo. Contrary to the surrealist painter René Magritte’s The Treachery of 
Images, which depicts an image of a pipe with the provocation “this is not a pipe,” this 
advertisement begins by presupposing and then proclaiming the factual status of the image being 
an apple (i.e. “this is an apple”). CNN’s assertion that the image represents an apple is not likely 
challenged by the viewer; it is already understood, even common-sensical. There is no doubt that 
the narrator is correct. Moreover, only a contrarian would disagree: the assertion does not make 
us move from the status of doubting or questioning that this image of an apple is an apple. 
Relatedly, we do not move from believing that this is not (an image of) an apple to later realizing 
it is, in fact, an image of an apple. Accordingly, the narrator’s (factual) claim does not attempt to 
move us to a new position. Instead, it reinforces what viewers already think, and it alludes to 
similarly apparent and common-sensical claims in the political sphere.  
 Already, the rhetorical power of this approach to facticity is dubious. First, it reduces the 
complexity present in creating factual statements to something that should be recognized by 
everyone with ease (“this is as simple as identifying an apple”). Though some facts appear as 
simple to “us,” many require extensive work and verification through peer review to establish 
(e.g. reading changes in carbon dioxide levels in Arctic ice sheets). This is to say that if there is 
sometimes the need for extensive work to generate facts, it should follow that it takes rhetorical 
work to display the correctness of such statements, especially for those who are skeptical or 
antagonistic. In other words, if there is the possibility of misunderstanding for those sympathetic 
to factual claims (e.g. that hot summers demonstrate climate-change), then it is unlikely that 
these claims will be believed or will motivate changes for those attracted to counter-factual 
statements. While “this is not a pipe” suggests caution for overly simple and matter-of-fact 
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images, the rational-deliberative “this is an apple” equates this certainty with correctness. Such 
confidence, even if well intentioned, does not address the tastes of audiences sympathetic to 
counter-factual claims or apply to situations where defining what we are looking at, is not so 
simple as naming a piece of fruit.    
 Next, the narrator contrasts those of us who know this claim to be correct with “some 
people” who are not us. These other people will insist to “us” that this is not an apple, that “our” 
certainty is wrong, and provide a claim that is just as certainly wrong to our eyes as ours is to 
them. Here, then, is a clear division between those who understand what is correct, the narrator 
and the viewer, and the “some people” who are not directly being addressed.86 “We” who 
(correctly) understand that this image is an apple and “they” or “those others” who 
misunderstand that this is a banana. “They” who misunderstand not only do not recognize the 
obvious character of the apple, not only recognize to be true something that is just as obviously 
incorrect (the banana), but then have the drive to tell us that we are wrong, that we are seeing 
incorrectly by not seeing a banana.  
It is clear within these first two sentences that there are (at least) two different groups, 
“us” who are right and “they” who are wrong. At least initially, “they” cannot make “us” think 
otherwise. Perhaps, there reciprocally is an inability for “us” to meaningfully communicate with 
them. This reciprocal failure of communication becomes clear through the next two lines of the 
advertisement. The “banana group” is presented as insistent about how correct they are. We 
imply that they wildly scream in contrast to the narrator’s (and presumably our) calm and 
collected air of rationality. There is the sense that they are assured of what they think to such an 
                                               




extent that they will do whatever is within their power to let “us” know that (they believe) this is 
a banana.    
Finally, the narrator explains the effect of the status of the apple being challenged with 
the status of “banana-hood.” Because of those trying to tell us this is a banana, and more 
importantly, the self-assured way we are being told this image is a banana rather than an apple, 
some of us, maybe even the individual viewer (“me”), might start to take this claim seriously. 
Our sureness in the image being an apple, at the very least, might waver. This seemingly certain 
image-as-apple that our eyes tell us and we were confident in might become unsure and seriously 
put into question.  
How does the narrator reassure us that we are right? How does she counter and persuade 
the viewer, and maybe even some of those convinced this is a banana though it is actually an 
apple, that it is better to see it as an apple, and maybe even more significantly, that the way of 
seeing that sees this image as an apple rather than a banana is a better way to see?  
They do not. The narrator merely contests the claim by reasserting the factual character 
of the previous claim that she made. Confidently articulating, “but it’s not,” incredulously acting 
as if this mere assertion can truly speak to the people who are in doubt, let alone those, 
“scream[ing] banana, banana, banana!” She states, “This is an apple,” as if the repetition will 
finally allow this fact to “speak for itself.” To apply the same faith in facticity that will somehow 
now finally overcome all of those who believe otherwise. To believe we can and should dictate 
to others and compel them to see as we see, even if they do not and to do this while acting as if 
they already see the way “we” do. To act as if we can produce a statement that is outside of or 
“immune” to the needs of engaging in discourse and taking seriously the challenges of rhetoric 
for those who do not already subscribe to the worldview and ways of being-in-the-world that 
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“we” do. In short, it is optimistic to say the same thing at the beginning of the narration as at the 
end, without really taking up what others have to say, even if they are wrong, and expect a 
different result.  
The advertisement concludes with the proclamation “facts first,” an empty platitude 
when, for better or for worse, the power of facticity is clearly in decline politically. Moreover, 
when facticity no longer appears as the neutral arbiter of truth everyone obeys, but instead as 
tools, means, and even weapons to be hurled at opponents, then “facts first” is not an arena 
outside of the political, but is enmeshed in it. Most plainly, when this advertisement that 
proclaims itself to be for “facts first” is created in response to a political attack claiming CNN as 
“fake news,” then it is too farfetched to believe in a neutrality or disinterestedness in the truth 
that the advertisement purports to uphold through an absurdly over simplistic depiction of truth’s 
opponents.     
This advertisement is an example of what may be designated as a deliberative-
rationalistic approach to rhetoric. As demonstrated above, it more-or-less presupposes that 
everyone operates through a generally detached approach to truth, goodness, and beauty. This 
approach affords deference to the powers of logic, meticulous and disinterested observation, and 
expertise deriving from these. It understands the human being, at our root, as homo economicus, 
the rational being.  
 A cursory glance at the newspaper should reveal that this model of the character of 
human beings is a clear misunderstanding, especially when it purports to describe human beings 
comprehensively and universally. The people who yell “banana, banana, banana,” are not just 
mistaken about the factual status of their claim. They do not care about a paradigm that yields to 
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claims and evidence of facticity. Therefore, they do not adhere to this essential requirement of 
the deliberative-rationalistic paradigm.  
Far-Right Indifference to the Rational-Deliberative Idea of Facticity  
If these irrational others did adhere to a rational-deliberative perspective, they could not 
maintain the overconfident stance demonstrated by the magnitude of the repetition of false 
statements that the 2016 was the largest electoral landslide since Reagan, or that the 2017 
inauguration had the largest attendance in history, or that the 2018 State of the Union address 
had the largest viewership. (A recurring size-oriented theme is apparent). If these irrational 
individuals did adhere to the deliberative-rationalistic paradigm, they could not even utter these 
statements, not to mention doubting or retracting such statements. Under such a framework, the 
evidence of the status of these claims is unmistakably clear; we can easily compare all of the 
previous materials to find it untrue. Truly, statements like these are incomprehensible from the 
rational-deliberative view.  
 The challenge, then, is to comprehend this incomprehensibility; to understand how and 
why these claims (and far-right ones more generally) are made in order to suggest ways to 
counter, subvert, and hopefully best them. Further, we need to demonstrate that an overreliance 
on facticity is a problematic and insufficient approach to confronting far-right rhetoric. As such, I 
argue that a major problem with the rational-deliberative approach to rhetoric is that it does not 
appreciate the indifference of the far right to the notion of facticity. In contrast to those who 
portray them as “anti-fact,” I understand the far right as not necessarily antagonistic to facts 
because they are facts. Instead, recalling Hofstadter, they seem to only care about evidence that 
aligns with their preexisting convictions. Their so-called facts, or “alternative facts,” are 
necessarily those that align with their convictions. So antagonism for facts as such is not the 
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issue. Instead, it is the inability of the far right to appreciate and be moved by evidence that 
contests their convictions.    
 Toward this end, consider the infamous “alternative facts” exchange between reporter 
Chuck Todd and White House aid Kellyanne Conway following the inauguration of Donald 
Trump. After continuous talking over one another about the press secretary’s insistence on the 
record setting size of the new president’s inauguration crowd, the key moment of the exchange 
occurred: 
Todd: . . . Answer the question of why the president asked the White House press 
secretary to come out in front of the podium for the first time and utter a falsehood? Why 
did he do that? It undermines the credibility of the entire White House press office . . .  
Conway: Don't be so overly dramatic about it, Chuck. What – You're saying it's a 
falsehood. And they're giving Sean Spicer, our press secretary, gave alternative facts to 
that . . .  
Todd: Wait a minute – Alternative facts? . . . Look, alternative facts are not facts. They're 
falsehoods.87 
This exchange is interesting for several reasons. First, it is telling that the use of airtime is 
prioritized for undermining a claim that even Todd admits is a “small and petty thing.”88 There is 
the sense that if Todd can get Conway to admit the smallest error or lie that it will erode her 
support. That if it becomes clear to Conway’s sympathetic audiences that she is not adhering to a 
rational-deliberative paradigm then Trump's supporters will no longer support such politics. 
Instead of devoting energy to questioning and challenging the horrendous rhetoric and politics of 
                                               





the administration, he spends the entire interview attempting to maneuver Conway into a position 
where she has to admit that the president uttered “a small and petty” falsehood. That Todd would 
devote so much energy to this minor falsehood displays this rational-deliberative impulse to fact-
check, even at the expense of rhetorically contesting more consequential aspects of far-right 
politics.  
While Todd attempts to compel Conway to admit a falsehood, Conway is provided a 
platform to promote the policies and actions of the president that go unchallenged throughout the 
interview. Todd seems to act as if this will have meaningful, even great rhetorical significance in 
undermining the Trump presidency. When put so bluntly, it becomes abundantly clear that this is 
a ridiculous impulse to waste rhetorical energy and time this way, but it is telling about the 
character of the deliberative-rationalistic paradigm that is too frequently relied on.  
 Moreover, this maneuver had such little rhetorical potency to Conway that she 
completely disregards the adherence to facticity by making a claim that the press secretary’s 
claims were alternatively factual; disregarding the notion of a single universal common sense or 
way of seeing that is already universally agreed upon and that everyone therefore adheres to. 
When we imagine that Todd believes he has unleashed his trap successfully, forcing the 
admittance of a falsehood by the preposterous notion of facts as having alternatives, his tactic 
falls flat. It comes off just as small and petty as the remark he recognizes as such coming from 
the president.  
More generally, this means Conway can continue to attack the press and be a mouthpiece 
for the administration’s agenda. Conway can simultaneously reassert the size of the crowd and 
defend the president’s “alternative fact,” while she leans on a fact (albeit a misleading one). She 
has no moral qualms about pointing to the Nielsen viewership ratings estimating thirty-one 
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million people watched the 2017 inauguration vs. approximately twenty-one million viewers for 
the 2013 inauguration. (Trump’s inauguration was still smaller than Obama’s 2009 inauguration, 
with an estimated thirty-eight million and the record set of about forty-two million viewers set by 
Reagan’s 1981 inauguration).89 Therefore, Conway and her sympathetic audiences are indifferent 
to the rational-deliberative notion of facticity; they coincidentally adhere to it when it fits their 
convictions and contradict it when this is necessary to maintain their convictions.   
 Consequently, because of her and her audience’s indifference to the rational-deliberative 
idea of facticity, Conway easily pivots to other topics that are more contentious and important to 
a sizable portion of the American people than whether or not the president stated a falsehood or 
made an “exaggerated” claim about the size of his inaugural crowd. Again, throughout the whole 
interview, Conway is not challenged about the character of the executive orders Trump signed or 
other policy positions he holds. Todd failed in his likely aim to “nail” Conway on a lie or, to use 
former vice-presidential candidate Sarah Palin’s term, to use a “gotcha question” that would 
make Conway slip up and, in effect, undermine the credibility of the President of the United 
States for those who voted for him was. 
 We may interpret this to be, in part, because of the misunderstanding of the character of 
our way of seeing, or to use the traditional philosophical term for our aesthetic common sense, a 
misunderstanding of sensus communis.90 Provisionally, this is to say that underappreciating the 
aesthetic character of sensus communis and overestimating what Kant calls “common human 
understanding” puts rational-deliberative rhetoric on shaky terrain. Rational-deliberative and far-
                                               
89 "Nearly 37.8 Million Watch President Obama's Oath and Speech on TV," Nielsen, last 
modified January 21, 2009. http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2009/nearly-378-
million-watch-president-obamas-oath-and-speech.html 
90 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Merideth (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 123-127. 
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right rhetoric do not share the same epistemological concerns. This is because, as is apparent in 
the exchange between Todd and Conway, there is not a single universal and common way of 
sensing and perceiving; Conway’s ability to utter the phrase “alternative facts” displays that she 
is operating under a dissimilar way of seeing. I will address the relationship between 
misunderstanding sensus communis as universal epistemology and “alternative facts” further 
after describing the rhetorical fickleness of the predominant rational-deliberative notion of 
facticity. 
Fickleness of Facticity  
 A final note concerning the precarious nature of an approach relying chiefly on facticity 
to engage in political persuasion is that facts and political evaluation have a capricious 
alignment. This is to say that there is cleavage between our beliefs and the “side” the facts “come 
down on.” For example, in a recent fact-check by CNN of The State of the Union Address, 
CNN’s so-called “reality check team” evaluated as true Trump’s claim that his presidency has 
overseen the creation of 2.4 million jobs and the lowest rate of African-American 
unemployment, and that the “defeat [of] ISIS has liberated very close to 100% of the territory 
held by these killers.”91 If one holds a political position that is contrary to the Trump 
administration, and if one’s position upholds the supremacy of facticity in the political realm, 
then one is left in an awkward position. On the one hand, it is possible to find these politics 
profoundly distasteful and unethical, and yet particular facts or elements of facticity do support 
                                               
91 Interestingly, the video broadcast began with a statement they evaluate as true, while the 
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Check Team, “CNN’s Reality Check Team vets Trump’s State of the Union,” last modified on 




these politics. They are not simply counter-factual. In other words, to disagree with Trump, and 
to find that facticity does not exclusively align with political positions contrary to his creates the 
uncomfortable problem of having to admit the accuracy of such claims and yet nevertheless 
disagree with the politics of the president. Facts cannot dictate beliefs, they can only inform 
them. Facticity can contradict beliefs without warranting or compelling a change of heart.  
 Consequently, one either needs to entertain positions that are abhorrent or admit that 
facticity alone should not dictate political taste. Additionally, even if one “sides” with facticity, 
the “fact” that dissonance can be felt between facticity and political desires means that there is 
never a simple adherence to facticity–the nature of the world must be negotiated, including our 
feelings and our desires for how the world could and should be. Thus, rather than accept 
abhorrent politics because of some alignment with aspects of facticity, it seems justified to admit 
the truth of political taste, i.e. aesthetic sensibilities and ethical proclivities that reject these 
politics because of their appearance to us. Therefore, because of the (at-times) fickleness of 
facticity with regard to politics, there are limits to basing political taste in facts, Yet, this does not 
mean one needs to abandon facticity as such. Perhaps then, because people are often more apt to 
adhere to political sense rather than (and even in contradiction to) notions of facticity, a notion of 
truth of and from our feelings should be entertained.      
 In sum then, facticity as such has no exclusive friends; we can imagine a style of facticity 
that necessarily tailors particular claims toward a (to some degree) preconceived general 
understanding of the world. Recalling Nietzsche’s famous provocation, “there are no facts, only 
interpretations,” we may interpret him in this context to mean that there is nowhere outside the 
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boundaries of perception, i.e. how sense is made of the world, from which judgments are made 
and acted on.92  
The Rhetorical Problem of Sensus Communis as Universal Common Human 
Understanding 
 From this rhetorical insufficiency of facticity, one may believe it possible to return to a 
fundamental notion of common sense, something that we can all agree upon. From this, 
ostensibly, it might be possible to create the tools to undermine the power of neo-fascistic 
rhetoric. Put otherwise, even if we cannot persuade others through sheer facticity, perhaps we 
can do so through the common sense we share. Indeed, if everyone shares a similar way of 
understanding themselves, others, and world, and conclusions from this way of perceiving the 
world manifest as a more-or-less uniform particular content that all can work from, then it would 
seem that a simple rhetorical application of this universal sensibility would be overwhelmingly 
moving politically. 
 However, the notion of a universal sensibility misunderstands the character of common 
sense and its relation and relatedness to the social, political, and cultural spheres. This is because 
if such an understanding of common sense was reflected in the world, it seems unlikely that far-
right politics could emerge unless the world was already understood in such a way. Further, this 
conception could not account for the variety of ways that people perceive the world. If such 
common sense was truly common, then agreement would already be readily achievable–leaning 
on common sense would compel people to “come to their senses” in a similar way they 
supposedly would when presented with evidence of facticity. With this in mind, I will explore 
how a rationalistic deliberative style of rhetoric misunderstands common sense and how this 
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misunderstanding relates to its rhetorical shortcomings. Then I explore the character of sensus 
communis, leaning on aesthetic philosophy, to better understand the character and role of 
common sense and to uncover the role of taste and judgment regarding attraction, repulsion, or 
indifference to particular ways of being-in-the-world.  
To demonstrate this, take an example that relates strongly to the need for an aesthetic 
notion of common sense in order to persuade others. Shortly after the Las Vegas shooting, 
Jimmy Kimmel, during his opening monologue, addressed the need to act on gun violence.93 
Reaching the peak of his crescendo, Kimmel made a desperate appeal to a seemingly universal 
notion of common sense “beyond” politics for something to be done. “What I’m talking about 
tonight isn’t about gun control, it’s about common sense. Common sense says no good will ever 
come from allowing weapons that can take down 527 Americans at a concert.”94 He makes an 
appeal to common sense understood as what Kant designates “common human understanding.” 
Kant describes mere common human understanding as “the least we can expect from anyone 
claiming the name of a human being.”95 This is in contrast to sensus communis aestheticus as 
shared or communal feelings presupposed as generally valid for the American public. In other 
words, sensus communis aestheticus is a communal sense as compared with "common human 
understanding"; sensus communis aestheticus is the a priori grounds that informs the tastes and 
feelings of communities and that make these communicable to others. An uncomfortable 
question that arises from this, then, is whether Kimmel is truly appealing to the lowest common 
denominator of understanding. Relatedly, is this rhetorically motivating for those who need to be 
                                               
93 Jimmy Kimmel, “Jimmy Kimmel on Mass Shooting in Las Vegas,” American Broadcasting 
Company, October 2, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ruYeBXudsds 
94 Ibid.  
95 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Merideth (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 123. 
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moved for action to occur? Can appealing to common human understanding rather than sensus 
communis aestheticus contest the right-wing politics that prevent meaningful reforms from 
occurring?  
Accordingly, then, Kimmel is right that we are working from and with the ground of 
common sense when engaging discursively about this issue, but perhaps not in the way that he 
supposes. Rather than understanding such a level of common understanding as a yet-to-be 
achievement (that we can debate the possibilities and merits of), Kimmel acts as if this common 
understanding is already pre-given and constructed to such an extent that it is obvious and 
accepted upon by almost everyone. It should constitute the very least that anyone can presuppose 
in the understanding of others. Here is the rub: Kimmel’s description of common understanding 
is already beyond the purview of Kant’s common understanding, the very least we can expect 
from other human beings concerning the lowest common denominator of understanding 
concerning gun violence. It is not common sense; the structure of sensus communis does not 
grant us this pre-given level of understanding concerning this (or any other) issue.  
This conflation of common understanding with sensus communis is most evident in 
Kimmel’s next sentences. He continues by describing his interpretation of a supposed shared 
universal understanding of this issue but then points to 56 senators who do not share this 
sentiment. “Common sense says don’t let those who suffer from mental illness buy guns. Who 
thinks that makes sense? Them I guess.”96 Presupposing the common understanding of others, 
when a sizable and disproportionately powerful group adheres to a different view, is a 
rhetorically questionable approach and should prompt us to reevaluate our interpretation of 
sensus communis if we are to work from it toward changing the status-quo. Kimmel himself 
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displays the non-universal character of his own claims by pointing to a majority of US senators 
who do not act on Kimmel’s notion of common sense and who, at the very least, represent a 
sizable chunk of the American public that also do not adhere to his view of common 
understanding.  
Accordingly, it is unwise to operate as if only when positions, beliefs, and attitudes are 
universally shared could one presuppose and build discourse from them. Indeed, if the public 
were truly in possession of Kimmel’s hoped for common sense it seems less likely like there 
would be the cycle of violence and outrage in the first place or, at least, more ability to change 
the laws and the culture so as to break the cycle.  
A Contest of Taste: The Need for Rhetorical Contestation of the Far Right on the 
Terrain of Sensus Communis Aestheticus  
However, with Kant, common human understanding does not exhaust the meaning of 
sensus communis. Kant offers us a different notion of common sense that reflects the aesthetic 
dimension of politics. He also describes the public faculty of taste as a kind of sensus communis. 
For the contemporary context, this means considering the terrain of aesthetic taste as a factor in 
the resilience of the far-right against rational-deliberative rhetoric and as a sign of hope that the 
terrain can be modified. Moreover, the ability to be moved to different tastes and politics is 
contingent on how narrowly or broadly one’s communal taste can imagine the standpoint of 
others, can reflect on these feelings, and can allow reflection to meaningfully inform one's 
judgment. Put another way, if the far right is dogmatic in their consideration of contrary tastes, 
and rational-deliberative rhetoric does not address this distaste for oppositional politics, then 
opponents of the far right need to imagine rhetorics that contest the dogmatism of far-right taste 
and not just the apparent lack of sense in far-right politics. Therefore, taste as a kind of sensus 
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communis should not be conflated with the lowest common denominator of common human 
understanding.  
In this historical moment, perhaps because of an inability to meaningfully imagine and 
reflect upon the standpoint of others and because of a default to discord over accord, there 
appears to be an absence of sensus communis. It appears that many are dogmatic in their tastes, 
especially among the far right whose solidified convictions Hofstadter describes. Yet, common 
and potentially pluralistic-democratic tastes need to be built from and with the common tastes of 
others. Tastes are not formed in a vacuum. The community one finds oneself in influences one's 
tastes. To rhetorically move others toward imagining and creating better worlds, then, is a matter 
of working from the tastes and judgments of others as they are. If democratic tastes and feelings 
are to be cultivated, then this is where it may be safely presupposed that work should begin. 
Moreover, it is important to understand that sensus communis is always related to and imbued 
with particular historical content, i.e. aesthetic history conditions how able or well we are to 
imagine the viewpoints of others; that is, it conditions the ground of our rhetorical situation. 
Therefore, it is important to deal with the ever-changing historical content and particulars of 
sensus communis aestheticus instead of believing that an ahistorical common human 
understanding can provide a blueprint for discourse and practices by which to contest the far 
right.      
Although reliance on common human understanding is impossible, taste as sensus 
communis is a ground on which the far right can be contested. Common aesthetic tastes can be 
presupposed and worked from to construct different contents of common sense. We may point to 
the ontological character of language and communication to demonstrate this. Merleau-Ponty in 
Phenomenology Perception writes, “Through speech . . . there is a taking up of the other 
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person’s thought, a reflection in others, a power of thinking according to others, which enriches 
our own thoughts.”97 By virtue of being-in-the-world, we are granted the potentiality of 
imagining the different possible feelings of others. This notion of communal sense, not reducible 
to any particular content or context of understanding, is the form and ability to feel and be felt by 
others (though admittedly is also the ground of misapprehension). Indeed, feeling always “takes 
place” with and in the views of others, i.e. publicly. This mitsein or being-with is not separate 
from the “I” that I am, as if I am first an individual that does or does not take up the relations of 
sensus communis. I do not choose at one moment to be in this public and at another moment to 
retire into a wholly separate isolated “I.” Rather, this connection, relation, and with-ness are 
imbued into my very way of being such that I could not be an “I” without a “We,” or, to use 
Heidegger’s phrase, a “they.”98  
However, it is important to note that this ontological characteristic should not be 
confused with an endorsement of our historical “taking-up” of communal sense. Just because we 
can imagine and reflect upon the possible viewpoints of others and cannot help but be 
ontologically social, this does not mean it can be done well or easily. And yet what is needed is 
precisely to do this well if one is to confront and ultimately best the rise of increasing banal and 
vicious sentiments in the public. Therefore, although the public cannot help but have a 
communal sense and that sense cannot help but be entwined with its publicness, there are 
nonetheless better and worse ways of developing this sense.  
Applying the conception of sensus communis just outlined to the rhetorical question of 
confronting far-right rhetoric and, recognizing the insufficiency of a deliberative-rationalistic 
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rhetorical model, it is important to stress that the communal character of sensus communis is 
intimately related to our tastes and judgment as a condition for its possibility. Following Kant 
and Arendt, it is important to understand taste (as a kind of sensus communis) that is intertwined 
with our communal makeup. For example, when Jimmy Kimmel points to the others who do not 
adhere to the common sense he is discussing, it is not simply a matter of logical disagreement. 
Rather, the differences in their communal sense and in their communal tastes necessitate that 
they see this issue differently. They are a part of a different group with different preferences and 
therefore see things differently. So different, that it is as if they are not dealing with the “same 
thing.”  
Concerning the character of disagreements between groups in relation to their sense of 
community taste, Hannah Arendt in her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy cites Cicero 
observation, “I would rather be wrong with Plato than right with the Pythagoreans.”99 This 
provocation demonstrates that people do not simply aim to be correct or to avoid being incorrect 
in dealing with others, as if it does not matter who one is “with” or what community one desires 
to be a part of. Conversely, the styles, attitudes, and preferences of the group with which one 
identifies often matter more than whether their views are correct or not. Whom one identifies 
with stylistically matters a great deal in one’s judgment of the truth and goodness of others. For 
example, when one finds likable a politician who “tells it like it is,” a part of the attraction seems 
to stem from the way they tell “it” at least as much as what they tell. The communities that 
people believe embody truth and goodness are usually also found attractive, such that attraction 
and repulsion (i.e. aesthetics) are related to judgments of truth and goodness.  
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This relationship between tastes that produce affective discrimination and judgments of 
truth and goodness is not incidental. As Arendt notes, “One judges always as a member of a 
community, guided by one’s community sense, one’s sensus communis.”100 What is key here for 
this project is that common sense is not a particular universal content that we all share, or even a 
universal kinship that identically colors all of our seeing; instead a multiplicity of common 
senses are enmeshed with our ways of judging and the particular judgments that we make. To 
use Kantian parlance, sensus communis is not exhausted by sensus communis logicus, but also 
includes sensus communis aestheticus.101 Communal sense, then, necessarily includes a sense of 
communal taste–what attracts and repulses us, our inclinations and disinclinations, what we are 
pleased and displeased by. In essence, that we all judge is given; how we judge is contingent.   
Taking a multiplicity of communal senses as the present rhetorical context, a 
deliberative-rationalistic paradigm is insufficient, at the very least because it does not adequately 
take into account the aesthetic register of sensus communis. Specifically, I argue, the aspects of 
communal character of common sense and its related aesthetic tastes and judgments are 
underappreciated as a way for motivating others through discourse. Correspondingly then, there 
must be something about far-right rhetoric’s ability to not only appeal to different groups’ senses 
of and tastes from common sense, but also to cultivate and encourage certain preferences from 
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 CHAPTER 3 
APPRECIATING AFFECTIVE ARMOR: SKETCHING AN AESTHETIC 
DIAGNOSTIC OF THE FAR RIGHT  
In the previous chapter, I described rational-deliberative rhetoric as insufficient to contest 
the far right. I also suggested that the aesthetic dimension of sensus communis, i.e. communal 
taste and feelings, informs and contributes to the resilience of far-right politics against its 
opposition. If far-right politics do not adhere to a rational-deliberative paradigm of understanding 
and collective decision-making, and this paradigm is not effective in countering such politics, 
then a different rhetorical approach should be taken.  
Before sketching a rhetorical orientation that might better contest far-right politics, it is 
important to appreciate why they are resilient. Therefore, it is necessary to sketch elements of the 
aesthetic terrain of the far right in order to point toward what opposing the far right should entail 
rhetorically. To imagine therapies that could address the ailment of authoritarian attitudes to 
democratic politics, one needs a good diagnosis to inform the appropriate therapy. As the 
previous chapter suggests, the predominant form of rational-deliberative rhetoric misunderstands 
what it opposes. Adherents to this form of rhetoric tend to conceive of human beings as homo 
economicus, which presumes that people are motivated by neutral and rational analysis of 
evidence, and offer their corrective to far-right politics based on this view. In contrast, this 
chapter offers a diagnosis of far-right politics based on Luc Ferry’s notion of homo aestheticus, 
which conceives of human beings as significantly motivated by their communal tastes and 
feelings.102      
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From this interpretation of the character of human beings, I begin with a diagnosis of far-
right political rhetoric drawn from contemporary rhetorician Jenny Rice’s critique of “bullshit,” 
in which she deepens understanding of the aesthetic motivations of the far-right. Her analysis 
explains the problem of “hardened desire,” or dogmatic taste that lacks “porousness” toward 
other viewpoints and that resists reflection and reconsideration of convictions. From the 
symptomatic far-right preference for “bullshit,” I turn to Jeremy Engel’s genealogy of 
resentment to provide a contextual basis for the hardened rhetorical desire of far-right politics. 
One can see the cultivation of particular tastes in the rise of resentment-based politics. If far-right 
aesthetic judgments have been cultivated over time, this suggests that it is possible to engender 
different aesthetic inclinations, to reorient sensus communis toward democratic ethics. Such a 
possibility is daunting to consider, given the tenacity of an established sensus communis in the 
face of opposition.  
To describe the difficult yet possible challenge of reorienting sensus communis 
aestheticus, I examine Susan Sontag’s “Fascinating Fascism” to appreciate how such politics can 
be attractive and their affective pull given the history of resentful politics. To amplify and extend 
this analysis, I then consider Lawrence Grossberg’s dissection of the cultural dissatisfaction with 
the present through his idea of affective landscapes. Cultural judgments about the nature of the 
past, present, and future – and how they relate to each other as a trajectory – obscure other, 
possibly better, futures. Finally, I stitch Kant’s distinction between determinant and reflective 
judgment to Grossberg’s description of contemporary politics. I suggest that Kant’s aesthetic 
vocabulary offers a means for an appropriate diagnosis of overdetermined judgments of 
possibilities that are present. Such vocabulary also suggests cultivating a taste for reflective 
political judgment as a therapeutic orientation to overdetermined judgment. 
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Resilience of Bullshit: Appreciating Far-Right Hardened Desires  
 Faced with the disregard (rather than necessarily the disdain) for facticity animating far-
right rhetoric, it hard not to find that the disregard and its discourses are “bullshit.” If a paranoid 
style characterizes far-right rhetoric, then bullshit is what it sounds like. It can be quite 
frustrating to confront such discourse because of its “bulletproof” character; bullshit is immune 
to conventional rhetorical tactics and rebuttals. As rhetorician Jenny Rice notes in her essay, 
“Disgusting Bullshit,” “The bullshitter bullshits whether or not she actually believes something 
to be the case.”103 This point is key in the confrontation with bullshit rhetoric. Too often, many 
would-be opponents of far-right discourse act as if bullshitters may be swayed in their thinking–
that it is simply a matter of them being misinformed. Accordingly, this purportedly can be 
rectified by “calling bullshit,” (pointing out the fallacious, inconsistent, or contradictory 
character of the claim), which will ostensibly rob it of its rhetorical power. Once robbed of this 
power, the bullshitter and her audience will “see the light” and, in good faith, change their 
position. Chuck Todd surely acted on this premise when he sparred with Kellyanne Conway over 
alternative facts. 
 Clearly, this is not the case that calling bullshit works. In fact, if this was the case, it 
seems the world would have long ago been rid of the practice of bullshitting. If the mere naming 
of bullshit stopped bullshit, then bullshiting probably would not occur. Bullshit persists even 
when called out as such (and perhaps especially so!). Therefore, the continuous attempts of 
pointing out the bullshit character of far-right claims appear as an insufficient, if not 
counterproductive, strategy to confront this type of rhetoric. This leaves the question: given the 
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negative consequences of bullshit, what can be done to effectively counter it, if merely “calling 
bullshit” fails to deprive it of its power? 
 To provide an answer requires a better understanding of the character of bullshit, its aims, 
and why it emerges in the first place. Rather than simply noting its counter-factual status, this 
will help provide an account of the resilience of this phenomenon. To do so, I rely on Rice’s 
definition, “Bullshit is a lack of concern for truth; bullshit is fakery for the purpose of achieving 
some hidden motive.”104 There are at least two important points to this definition. First, the 
“bullshitter” is not “playing the same game” as the person seeking truth in the rational-
deliberative sense. Their positions are not put forth in good faith in that they are not open to 
modulation, revision, or transformation. Nor do they really listen to responses. By this, I mean 
that the bullshitter does not take up what others have to say in such a way that the bullshitter may 
be changed by the encounter. It does not matter what one says in response against, to appease, or 
to provoke the bullshitter; if the aim is to move the bullshitter based on evidence and claims to 
truth “head on” one almost certainly cannot succeed.  
 Second, bullshit is about power, not truth. Following a deliberative-rational paradigm to 
rhetoric, many of us operate from the idea that truth, especially around notions of facticity, is 
powerful or that power eventually goes to those who are truthful. This gives the sense that truth 
will prevail and, in the end, emerge as powerful. Yet, a part of the disgust and revulsion toward 
bullshit is that it works–it often achieves its end without regard for truth. Indeed, Rice notes, 
“For the bullshitter, what matters is whether or not his or her goal is accomplished.”105 
Therefore, the usual rhetorical strategies that concentrate on inconsistency, contradiction, and 
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even conflict of interest are often ineffectual because these merely point out the character of 
something expressed as bullshit. They presuppose that decrying its counter-factual status and/or 
the negative aim it seeks can deprive bullshit of its potency. Again, following Rice’s 
understanding, “calling bullshit” is usually insufficient at best because this does not hamper the 
aim toward which bullshit is directed or lessen its indifference toward adhering to truths. Bullshit 
is not really a result of misunderstanding or ignorance. Consequently, the intentional character of 
bullshit is often underappreciated, yet necessary to understand and address this phenomenon.  
 To appreciate why people are drawn to bullshitting as a practice, we should consider the 
powerful connection to sedimented desires, in place of reflection, as one of its key constitutive 
aspects. Describing the rhetorical concerns versus the more “properly” philosophical descriptions 
of bullshit, Rice writes, “As rhetoricians, what should concern us about bullshit’s blockages is 
not so much the issue of truth . . . but the fact that any attempts to question, engage, or respond to 
bullshit’s claims are obstructed by layer[s] of hardened desire.”106 Here is where the aesthetic 
dimension of bullshit is apparent. Bullshit is resilient because it is attractive to its audiences. 
Both the emergence of and the resort to bullshit are intimately related to desire–the more 
intuitive, sentimental, and reactive aspects traditionally ascribed to human beings. Bullshit’s 
formation from and intimate communication with desire accounts for its ambivalence toward, 
rather than outright rejection of, truths in the rational-deliberative sense. As displayed from 
common maxims about the irrational aspects of human beings such as “the heart wants what it 
wants,” these demonstrate that the character and aims of desires are not determined calculated 
analysis, but instead by seemingly automatic reaction.  
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Nor are these desires monolithic. People seem to find themselves pulled toward different, 
even contradictory ends. This is not inherently good or bad. Indeed, as Hofstadter’s observes, 
while “the paranoid style has a greater affinity for bad causes than good . . . nothing really 
prevents a sound program or demand from being advocated in the paranoid style.”107 Yet for this 
project, when linked with far-right politics, a key problematic quality with the desire of bullshit 
is that it is hardened; it is impermeable, reinforcing its unyielding character in the face of and 
regardless of whatever response is provided.108 As Rice explains, “Countering bullshit . . . must 
deploy a response that does not begin from the assumption of porousness.”109 Rice uses the 
notion of rhetorical “blockage” or “build up” to describe impermeability, which may be 
interpreted as a metaphor for obstacles preventing discourse in good faith, to argue that we 
cannot presuppose bullshitters and those that “buy into it” are open to the possibility of being 
moved. Therefore, if the aims of bullshit are to be avoided, confronted, or contested, the counter- 
rhetoric to bullshit must be able to create a rhetorical porousness– it must open the way for 
meaningful listening to occur–to “de-bullshit” rather than just calling bullshit. If this rhetoric is 
to be contested, opponents of the far-right need to cultivate openness to reconsideration, or what 
I call in the next chapter a “prejudice for reflective judgment.” Concisely, rhetorical projects 
need to undo or dismantle rather than merely dismiss bullshit if they are to have a chance at 
success.   
This is no easy task. The hardened desire that makes bullshitting possible and its 
reception often have many antecedents that cannot simply be undone. As I will suggest below 
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following thinkers like Jeremy Engels, the festering of resentment will not be undone or 
overcome (assuming it can be undone and that this is a desirable outcome) through clever 
rebuttals or verbalization of sympathy. Admittedly, these may be necessary tactics to counter 
bullshit. Yet, by recognizing the character of bullshit as a power maneuver rather than 
rationalistic truth claim, its impermeability and its resistance to such efforts, and its foundation in 
desire, we at least have a better sense of how to orient rhetorical projects aiming to contest 
malignant forms of bullshit. Cultivating reflection and receptivity to others must be a common 
aim of such projects.  
The question of responding to neo-fascistic rhetoric, then, may come down to the 
question of what works? What can break through, or weaken this hardened desire? Jenny Rice’s 
account of deliberative rhetoric bouncing off of far-right bullshit is helpful in understanding the 
contemporary rhetorical situation in the United States. The problem is that deliberative rhetoric 
does not lessen recalcitrant desire; it does not make a mark or an impression upon either the 
rhetors of bullshit or those impressed by them. Accordingly then, we need rhetorics that temper 
desire, take hold, and persist; ones that make an impression upon those moved by bullshit. This 
is difficult because such rhetoric is resilient— it resists everything else. In this case, encouraging 
porousness requires a simultaneous acidity of an aesthetic orientation to weaken this type of 
rhetoric and a creativity that can catch on that may emerge from the artistic aspects of aesthetics 
to make an impression upon others. 
At the basis of bullshit, then, are the aesthetics that inform its hardened desires. Rice 
argues that aesthetic responses, “work to expose ways in which bullshit discourse is itself rooted 
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in a sentimental aesthetics.”110 This is to say that the explicit aesthetic responses to bullshit (e.g. 
disgust, revulsion, nausea) help illustrate the essential character of feelings and aesthetic 
evaluations and preferences of the desires that constitute bullshit. Richard Spencer’s provocation 
on the character of the so-called white race is an instance of this style of desire: “To be white is 
to be a striver, a crusader, an explorer, and a conqueror. We build, we produce, we go upward . . 
. For us it is conquer or die.”111 Here, the ideas of whiteness, authority, and dominance are key 
objects of the desire. These also imply to repulsion against what is not white; fear of a diverse or 
brown nation, and quasi-Christian values antithetical to science and democratic values. While a 
view toward truth in a rationalistic sense leaves us puzzled as to the character of bullshit, let 
alone how to successfully challenge it, an aesthetic orientation offers the chance to understand 
these desires so that they might be reoriented toward porousness.112  
If Rice is correct that, “Bullshit references nothing but its own sentiment,” then projects 
that challenge bullshit need to work from, through, and with these sentiments as they are. A 
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susceptible audiences to open the way for democratic tastes. See Wilhelm Reich, The Mass 
Psychology of Fascism, (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1970).  
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rhetoric that can counter bullshit rhetoric ought to address the taste, inclinations, and ways of 
evaluating, and desires of others to become more porous. Such openness could allow people to 
consider different evaluations. Moreover, broadmindedness could become attractive as a way of 
evaluating. Aesthetic strategies ought to encourage people to accept that not everything felt to be 
true or good is so, without denying the truthfulness of what, how, and why it is felt (even if in 
need of development). Indeed, with Rice, “We must create the conditions for which the call of 
conscience can be heard.”113 Left-leaning opponents of the far right must create the conditions 
for openness in addition to the specific democratic tastes, feelings, and desires that they hope to 
communicate. Openness must be created, it cannot be presupposed. Therefore, they would 
encourage democratic sentiments from a space of openness against the present closed and 
authoritarian desires. We need to orient our sentiments toward being open to different sentiments 
and sentimentality, so that even resentful, far-right citizens might feel the need to take up 
democratic ethics. Moreover, they might feel ethics anew.  
Historically Habituated Resentment and a Need for Democratic Aesthetic Imagination 
 If I have a book to have understanding in place of me, a spiritual adviser to have a 
 conscience for me, a doctor to judge my diet for me, and so on, I need not make any 
 efforts at all.114 
In the preceding analysis of bullshit, I have argued from Rice that bullshit is motivated by 
hardened desire and takes the form of a dogmatic rhetorical aesthetic. Bullshitters are resistant to 
any convictions contrary to their own, which suggests that opponents of far-right “bullshit” need 
to make hardened desire more porous to the views of others. To counter the rhetoric of far-right 
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politics requires recreating the conditions whereby democratic ethics may be not only heard, but 
also, necessarily, communicated. This requires more than aesthetic strategies; it requires a firm 
grasp of the emotional, contextual basis that grounds the paranoid bullshit of far-right rhetoric. I 
argue, following Jeremy Engels, that resentment can be understood as a key motivation for the 
rhetorical “symptom” of bullshit. I draw on pertinent aspects of Engels’ genealogy of American 
resentment in order to provide that context. With the understanding that resentment is the soil in 
which paranoia grows and that bullshit fertilizes, I suggest that an atrophying democratic 
imagination and a surging authoritarian imagination contribute to the resilience of far-right 
politics.  
An Interpretation of “Resentment” 
Consider the evolution of “resentment.” Classical Greco-Roman and liberal notions of 
democratic resentment saw it as the disempowered masses revolting against the ruling elite.  
According to Engels, Richard Nixon crystalized a shift in the political nature of resentment in the 
United States that divided the demos to the benefit of the elite. If democracy is always yet-to-
come, i.e. a perpetual project that is worked toward, and there are injustices that need to be 
addressed, then resentment is intertwined with necessarily imperfect democracy.115 This can be 
vital; channeling the feeling of dissatisfaction at one’s place in the world in comparison to the 
privileged is key to confronting and overcoming particular injustices. However, with Nixon’s 
style of resentment, legitimate reasons for the demos to be resentful were reoriented toward 
conflicts that split the demos into “the great silent majority” and the undemocratic and 
unpatriotic minority (e.g. student protestors, civil rights activists, racial minorities etc.). 
Accordingly, Engels writes, “[when] fractured into simple, simplistic, and all-too-easy binaries . . 
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. it [is] difficult to imagine ourselves as a demos acting collectively as a mighty agent of change 
and justice.”116 This is to say that the paranoid style’s caricatures of its political opponents, or, 
more precisely, enemies from such a view, have a long historical basis. Given a history of rigid 
caricature, it is nearly impossible to communicate with each other about resolving (or at least 
confronting) the causes of resentment. Communication even appears to be unnecessary; 
convictions do not need to be reevaluated in conversation with others when one feels obligated to 
choose between crude binaries—to stick with those in one’s own camp or defect.  
Resentment seems to encourage calcification of convictions, the hardened desire of a 
paranoid style. Inability or unwillingness to appreciate the political nuances of left-opposition 
tends to reinforce far-right convictions and vice versa. Indeed, concerning resentment, Engels 
writes, “As it is routinized, becoming over time civic habit, [such] politics cultivates an 
orientation of resentment that encourages citizens to live reactive rather than active lives.”117 If 
this is the case, the style of resentment exemplified by Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and Sarah Palin, 
and exaggerated by Donald Trump is not endemic to democracy; rightwing culture has provided 
a milieu in which such an orientation was possible and eventually has become actual.  
Resentment as Habitual  
However, the success of resentment politics makes it appear inevitable. Though 
resentment is culturally acquired rather than inherent to human nature, its habitual status can 
make it appear as intuitive, even natural and without alternatives. This is why it is resilient. If 
one has been acculturated into a reactive stance, i.e. if resentment has become habitual, then this 
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habit tends to cement itself. Merleau-Ponty in his Phenomenology of Perception offers a relevant 
example. He argues:  
It’s unlikely that I would in this moment destroy an inferiority complex in which I have  
been complacent now for twenty years . . . this past, if not a destiny, has at least a specific  
weight. . . Our freedom does not destroy [this] situation . . . so long as we are alive, our  
situation is open…118 
Like the person with a habitual inferiority complex, the cultural habit and resilience of 
resentment mean that in any given moment, it is unlikely that resentment will be exchanged for 
better democratic habits. That this tendency has been cultivated over decades means that it will 
be difficult to challenge. When resentment feels intuitive for many, it is unlikely, though still 
possible, that other feelings will be taken up. By being politically and culturally habitual, though 
it tends to perpetuate itself, these existing habits are still open to different habits. While 
resentment is resilient, it is not invincible. Habits can become otherwise. It is from this 
possibility that one can imagine rhetorical means for disrupting the civic habit of resentment and 
reorienting it and/or cultivating new habits. 
The tendency toward resentment reinforcing itself, thus, is a tendency and not an 
inevitability. This difference makes all the difference. It is the difference between the unlikely (or 
less likely) and the impossible. If we can disrupt the habituation of this civic habit and develop 
other habits, if we can encourage more active ways of being together, if we can cultivate 
prejudices for reflective judgment upon the particular happenings rather than subsume them 
under our previous conceptions, then we might be able to live more active lives. We might be 
able to re-orient resentment toward cathartic action that addresses the roots of resentment instead 
                                               
118 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 467. Emphasis Added.  
 
 71 
of toward scapegoating others that perpetuates this feeling of dissatisfaction. We might be able to 
construct new forms of common sense; how we live in common with others, are attracted and 
repulsed by particular happenings, and our capability of being affected.  
 Even if one is unconvinced by Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological description of habits 
as resilient yet open, the historical record demonstrates the potential to challenge resentment. 
Ironically, that Nixon crystalized the political habit of e pluribus duo displays the potential for 
new habits. This form of resentment was not always present. Political desire has not always 
manifested this way. The demos can change because it has changed. Though detrimental, 
nonetheless, there was a novelty about this style; certain attitudes were cultivated and adopted 
while others were discouraged and neglected. The possibility of novelty displays that the present 
style of resentment may also be discouraged and different attitudes may be encouraged. 
Therefore, what are the conditions for the possibility of challenging the habitual taste for 
resentment? How can democratic political tastes and habits become attractive to those 
sympathetic to the far right?  
A problem of habitual resentment is that if such a reactive stance is habitual, and there 
are limited spaces that encourage the creativity, imagination, and experimentation to consider 
and take up different convictions, then this habit tends to cement itself. In other words, many 
political, social, and cultural happenings reinforce the habitual blockages in peoples’ ways of 
seeing and acting. For example, the Las Vegas shooting of audience members at an outdoor 
merely concert sustained or reinforced many people’s convictions about the regulation of 





Atrophy of the Democratic Imagination  
Nixon’s shift to resentment in the form of e pluribus duo signals the habitual atrophy of 
the democratic imagination. There is no need to meaningfully imagine others because many 
believe they already know all they need to about others. Thus, there is no great need or value in 
understanding others. If there is little need to exercise a democratic imagination toward the Other 
because of the predominance of predigested caricatures of Otherness, then this tends to confirm 
prejudices, particular judgments toward difference and an overdetermined way of judging 
differences. Relatedly, because many who are possessed by resentment do not feel the need to 
broaden their views beyond their present ones, they seem to be rarely reflective in rendering 
judgment and instead merely apply what they already believe irrespective of particular situations. 
For example, the tragedies of inadequate action concerning the Flint water crisis or of Hurricane 
Maria are, at best, only marginally taken up in the course of judging. Instead, far-right rhetoric 
tends merely to apply pre-existing convictions, such as the imperative to restrain “big 
government” with austerity, to the given situation. The conditions are irrelevant to the desire. 
Indeed, such pre-judgment determines judgment.119  
 Therefore, members of the far right often overlook the living, material, and particular 
happenings of a given situation in favor of untethered, determinate, and “sedimented” truisms. 
This sedimentation is vicious; all happenings tend (and are all-but determined) to confirm and 
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reinforce our way of seeing the world. The calcification of judgment employs the imagination 
only to re-produce an image of the given issue in line with previous judgments, rather than make 
present or create an image that can put into question and challenge pre-judgments to broaden and 
sharpen feelings and understandings of political and cultural issues. 
Accordingly, one of the casualties of a habitually atrophied democratic imagination is the 
inability (and unwillingness?) to conjure up more distant and desirable possibilities. Under such 
conditions only the more limited possibilities present themselves to be actualized. This is 
because an emaciated imagination is more limited in what may it may envision and instead tends 
toward anemic, degraded repetition. When the demos finds itself under conditions that prompt 
resentment, such visual and affective stagnation of what could be only serve to maintain or 
intensify resentment to the point of reactionary outbursts. Rather than producing a long-awaited 
qualitative change to finally tackle the causes of resentful dissatisfaction (e.g. structural sexism, 
racism, and classicism), the tendency is toward maintaining and exacerbating these tensions. 
Relatedly, Engels writes that in contemporary rhetoric of resentment, “people [do] not act as 
much as react.”120 An atrophy of the imagination, or, the preponderance of the re-creative 
imagination over the creative imagination tends to produce shortsighted responses. Though the 
demos’ intuition prompts resentment because of its distaste for its place in society, it cannot 
conjure, let alone actualize, imaginative enough alternatives to set in motion a future different 
than the present. Or, at minimum, a resentful imagination cannot spark action adequate to 
address the roots of resentment. Rather, the present is merely negated without creating positive 
alternatives. Engels continues; “Citizens find it difficult to even imagine the transformative 
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power of democratic fraternity.”121 If democratic imagination has atrophied, i.e. our collective 
ability to make present and be open to new and preferable possibilities, then this only aids the 
perpetuations of our habitual resentment in its current form. A difficult paradox then arises; for 
the hope of democratic fraternity to be actualized, its potential must be imagined to excite us to 
this possibility and make it be desirable. Yet, to excite the imagination, there must already be the 
latent creativity that can allow for the chance of us imagining this possibility. Such a possibility 
may appear as unavailable because this democratic fraternity is not active in our memory, is not 
presently occurring, and is not foretold as likely to occur or worth occurring in the future.  
Therefore, displays or images of a possible democratic fraternity are needed to prompt 
the imagination to understand this possibility as possible and desirable, i.e. achievable and worth 
working for. At least two questions emerge: how can the imagination be excited to encourage 
attempts at democratic fraternity at smaller and larger scales before it is actualized, especially 
when the habit of resentment has become so cemented? Relatedly, what activities that “forecast” 
democratic fraternity can be “magnified” to excite the imagining of this possibility, and to excite 
the desire to incite action from and toward democratic fraternity? While not claiming to provide 
any definitive answers to these questions, I do think the importance of the imaginative aspects of 
projects are important in seeking to disrupt current incarnations of resentment and cultivate new 
ways of being together democratically.  
To review, we can and should critique the politics of resentment that motivate the 
rhetoric of e pluribus duo. Nonetheless, there is hope in the possibility of changing habits and far 
right’s success because they demonstrate the ability to shape and modify rhetorical taste that 
differs from the status quo of an ascendant far right. Even if we do not know beforehand what 




such a world precisely will look like, such a move is possible and seems necessary if there is to 
be hope in realizing a better world. Cultivating an aesthetic orientation toward democratic ethics 
and ends, one that feeds a desire for flexibility and not dogmatism, might be the right response to 
the hardened desire that motivates far-right political rhetoric. 
“Fascinating Fascism”: Aesthetic Appeal as “Non-Politically” Political 
 From Engel’s understanding of the historical and habitual resentment and an atrophy of 
the democratic imagination from Engels, I turn to the attractiveness of this habit by revisiting 
Susan Sontag’s “Fascinating Fascism.”122 Sontag offers an understanding of the staying power of 
resentment. By arguing that (neo)fascist longings are still felt, its resilience can be better 
understood. Resilience from (neo)fascist longings are difficult to communicate with for those 
hoping to contest their corresponding politics, especially when challenging the intuitive taste for 
and feeling of attraction for resentment. While Rice describes the challenge presented by resilient 
far-right bullshit, and Engels describes the strength of the historical and habituated character of 
far-right resentment, Sontag identifies and analyzes an even more profoundly difficult challenge 
to democracy from the far-right’s aesthetic longings. Such longings "charge” the far right; they 
not only immunize them against epistemic challenges, nor just inoculate them against 
deliberative politics, but also reflect dogmatic tastes that feel self-evident. Democratic projects 
face the difficult yet necessary task of undermining these tastes and feelings. Appreciating the 
depth of these tastes and feelings and their interrelation to the politics of resentment further 
develops the diagnosis of the far-right by looking at their aesthetic inclinations. I suggest that the 
aesthetics of traditional fascism of the 1920s-40s is echoed in the seemingly “cooler” neo-
fascism of the present.   
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In “Fascinating Fascism,” Sontag reviews Leni Riefenstahl’s film The Last of Nuba, the 
“air-brushing” of fascist aesthetics and their continued appeal. Sontag displays through discourse 
analysis the “rehabilitation” of Riefenstahl through the ostensible divorce of the aesthetic and the 
political and the growing appeal of her style a mere 30 years after the end of the second world 
war. This is similar to the rehabilitation and habituation of far-right politics in the present. By 
analyzing key moments in Sontag’s text, we can find insights into the continued relevance of the 
appeal of, taste for, and attractiveness of resentful and potentially fascistic habits. This can 
highlight the uncomfortable interrelatedness between the attraction to such aesthetics and (latent) 
taste for these politics. Perhaps the uncomfortable truth is that if we are to contest neo-fascistic 
politics, we must acknowledge their aesthetic appeal (even for those against such politics). 
Further, rhetorical programs that contest such politics may need to operate on the level of taste; 
they need to appreciate the taste for far-right politics if they are to cultivate distaste for these 
aesthetics and tastes for democratic ethical alternatives.   
 To begin, we may turn to an interview with Riefenstahl on her most famous works, 
Triumph of the Will and Olympiad. In a line eerily similar to Trump’s infamous Access 
Hollywood recording, Sontag quotes Riefenstahl’s interview, “I can simply say that I feel 
spontaneously attracted by everything that is beautiful . . . I am fascinated by what is beautiful, 
strong, healthy, what is living.”123 Here, we may get the sense that Riefenstahl is simply 
concerned with aesthetic, not political matters. She purports to be only attracted to beautiful 
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forms. This seemingly grants her innocence from the ethical and political muddiness (to put it 
mildly) of the content of her work. 
 Yet, the aesthetic appeal of her work and its political-ethical ramifications are more 
related than Riefenstahl claims. We can see this from within this very statement responding to 
the “German concern for form.” That her aesthetic fascination is with the “strong”, “healthy,” 
“what is living,” “harmony,” and makes her happy implies an ethical evaluation of the content, 
rather than an exclusively aesthetic evaluation concerning form. The qualities of being strong, 
healthy, living, harmonious, and happy are not solely aesthetic; to call something strong, healthy, 
living etc. is also to call something excellent which has ramifications for ethics and politics. In 
other words, Riefenstahl deeply associates, if not conflates, what she finds beautiful with what 
she finds to be good. To use a contemporary example, calling a southern border wall “beautiful” 
displays the connection between aesthetic judgments and the attraction to a politics of 
resentment. All of these traits are simultaneously aesthetically and ethically appealing.  
By tying aesthetic evaluation to resentful politics, affective fascination is a part of the 
staying power of neo-fascistic rhetorical habits. The power of resentful politics seems to stem 
from its affective charge; its ability to appeal to and to shift tastes. Therefore, being fascinated by 
resentful politics, one is simultaneously making an ethical evaluation; aesthetic judgments 
inform one’s ethical stance at least as much as ethical evaluations inform aesthetic judgments. As 
difficult as conflicts of ethics are, contesting seemingly self-evident and intuitive feelings is a 
difficult proposition. Moreover, when these attitudes have “contempt for all that is reflective, 
critical, and pluralistic,” or as Andrew Bokhari and Milo Yiannopoulous describe as “a 
preference for homogeneity over diversity, for stability over change, and for hierarchy and 
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order,” then these attitudes are de facto uncontested.124 Even if these attitudes are conventionally 
contested, the very feelings are armored against the possibility of feeling differently. Thus, their 
viciousness is twofold–not only in their specific content, (e.g. taste for unquestioned authority 
and obedience and disgust with diversity), but also its violence in principle to alternative 
sentiments as such.   
A part of this armoring arises from the belief in the self-evident and unchallengeable 
character of feelings. Concerning Riefenstahl’s rehabilitation, (which I link to the rehabilitation 
of far-right rhetoric), Sontag writes, “A [strong] reason for the change in attitude toward 
Riefenstahl lies in a shift in taste which makes it impossible to reject art if it is ‘beautiful.’”125 
Here, Sontag is describing the growing sentiment that, if art (and affect) is understood as a purely 
aesthetic phenomenon, that we may then only judge it aesthetically. Put differently, if the work 
seems only concerned with form (rather than form and content), then one may only judge it 
based on its ability to produce formal appeals irrespective of content. This understanding did not 
spontaneously arise; the Western aesthetic tradition often separates the aesthetic from the ethical 
and political spheres. Walter Benjamin is famous for equating aesthetic politics with the danger 
of fascism in his “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.”126 From the rise of 
such an attitude, critiques of the tastes and sentiments of resentful politics are impossible; merely 
“authentically” feeling something establishes its truth.  
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 Accordingly, as Sontag writes, “Riefenstahl’s films are still effective because . . . their 
longings are still felt.”127 These feelings react against what Goebbels describes as the tendency of 
“putting the head over the heart, the individual over the community, [and] intellect over 
feeling.”128 As displayed by the growth of neo-fascist rhetoric and sentiment, our culture 
maintains the conditions for the possibility of far-right politics; we are still inclined toward, 
enchanted by, and fascinated with this viciousness. Truly, many are still moved by these ways of 
being.  
Consequently, one of the differences between this cultural-political moment and the one 
Sontag discusses is that while she was working against the failure “to detect the fascist longings 
in our midst,” we are combatting the failure to contest the materialization of neo-fascism in our 
political institutions. What were (more or less) latent fascist tendencies have become manifest 
neo-fascistic rhetoric and practices. The place and relation of taste and aesthetics can no longer 
be ignored if we are to address one of the roots that allow for and make actual these practices.  
Affective Landscapes: Temporal Dissatisfaction and Kant’s Modes of Judgment 
An Interpretation of “Affective Landscapes.” 
 It is one thing to understand the depth of feeling in far-right paranoia’s resentful bullshit 
and that it is a habituated, historical form of rhetoric that can change. It is another to 
conceptualize how such feelings can and do change. I consider Lawrence Grossberg’s notion of 
affective landscapes for a social and cultural perspective on this phenomenon. The metaphor of 
affective landscapes offer a helpful account for diagnosing the motivations of far-right politics in 
that changing ‘landscapes’ suggests potential rhetorical therapies that adequately appreciate the 
                                               




social character of aesthetic cultivation. Then, I stitch his observation of a popular belief in the 
impossibility and unnecessary character of judgment in the public consciousness to suggest a 
turn to Kant’s aesthetic vocabulary. Kant’s differentiation between determinant and reflective 
judgment offers a fitting description of the different ways people judge politically. I use this 
vocabulary to provide a diagnosis of (over)determinant judgment within the far right and suggest 
a corrective or therapy through cultivating a prejudice toward habit of reflective judgment.  
 Affective landscapes offer a more nuanced understanding of the challenge of contesting 
far-right affective politics. Grossberg describes an affective landscapes as, “a complex social 
way of being in the world, a densely textured space within which some experiences, behaviors, 
choices, and emotions are possible, some ‘feel’ inevitable and obvious, and still others are 
impossible or unimaginable.”129 He likens affective landscapes to a fog or atmosphere that 
permeates not only the situations we passively experience, but also “its active conditions and 
expressions.”130 I understand this to denote the common and shared sentiments and attitudes that 
“one” (Heidegger’s das Man) feels; the terrain of sentiments and perceptions that inform 
peoples’ practices and comportment to the world.  
 The social sentiments and perceptions of affective landscapes can be applied to make 
sense of the far right. Similar to how Engel’s genealogy displays Nixonian resentful politics are 
historical rather than ontologically or naturally endemic to democracy, I understand these politics 
as social and cultural phenomena rather than only individualistic. To see resentment as derived 
from a social milieu better accounts for the character of this political phenomenon; it appreciates 
an intersubjective influence in motivating political convictions. Indeed, Grossberg describes 
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affective landscapes as “a key element in any calculation about how to change the [cultural and 
political] story.”131 We need to grasp where we are to better imagine where we can and should 
be. Such imaginings can inform the political actions that are taken. If affect arises from 
intersubjective landscapes, then the aim of countering far-right rhetoric should target the social 
and cultural aspects of feeling, rather than the specific feelings of individuals on the hope of 
simply persuading enough individuals to abandon the far right.   
Temporal Dissatisfaction 
  Resonating with Engels’ description of contemporary politics of resentment, Grossberg 
understands the emerging affective landscape in the United States to be “an organization of 
passive nihilism.”132 He maps four predominant strands: affective autonomy, anxiety and 
hyperactivism, sociality as personalization (narcissism), and temporal alienation.133 For this 
section, I briefly review affective autonomy and focus on temporal alienation. The affective 
autonomy links well with the previous chapter’s description of sensus communis aestheticus. 
Grossberg asserts, “people are increasingly aware of the contradictions that define their common 
sense, and they have learned to live comfortably with them.”134 As argued in the previous 
chapter, simply revealing the unknown facts or inconsistencies within people’s worldviews 
cannot change those views. At least to a certain degree, the contradictions do not matter. They 
are sustained through commitments to particular forms of common sense, the sensus communis 
that is essential to selfhood. To alter or abandon aesthetic common sense, even if understood as 
                                               
131 Ibid.  
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid, 93-94.  
134 Grossberg, Under The Cover of Chaos, 95. Emphasis Added.  
 
 82 
inconsistent or self-contradictory, is to alter and abandon one’s current way of being–to become 
a “new” person.   
Therefore, it is necessary to dis-ease habitual resentment. Here, understanding the feature 
of temporal alienation in the present affective landscape advances my diagnosis of the resilience 
of the far right. A part of this dis-easing of common sense should disrupt senses of temporality. 
This is to say our understanding and how we act on what we believe/feel about time is co-
constitutive of sensus communis. Grossberg concisely describes our attitude toward time: “It is 
as if it is always too soon too late; there is no present that can be the right time.”135 Indeed, this 
echoes the famous proclamation in Hamlet that is of particular interest to Derrida, “Time is out 
of joint.” Part of the fuel feeding a vicious resentment derives from a collective feeling of the 
exhaustion of the past, dissatisfaction with the present, and futility of the future. Many on the 
right seem to imagine the past as spent, the present as more-or-less static, and the future as the 
mere continuation of what already is and has been. No present or series of presents can amount 
to a future, or something worth traveling toward. To use Ernst Bloch’s phrase, there is within far-
right rhetoric an underappreciation of the “not-yet”–the possibilities in the present that are 
informed by memories of the past to imagine and actualize (un)certain futures.  
A greater appreciation of the not-yet seems to be precisely what is needed if we are to 
orient a public common sense toward better possibilities; to “lean into” a re-enchanted present 
that can give birth to qualitatively different futures. To feel the power and promise of possibility–
to understand that not-yet as potentially yet-to-be so that it can become actual. Contrary to the 
current temporal alienation, it seems our affective landscape, our sensus communis, should 
appreciate and remember the past, so that the future is more open, hopeful, and can be 
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qualitatively different. We need to feel that the present is dynamic, that it is a rich enough place 
for individuals to learn from the past and to work on projects for a better and more democratic 
future. This “pragmatic utopian” orientation does not purport to work toward an ever-receding 
future, though success is never certain. Instead, the aim is to imagine workable moments in the 
present that can produce better futures. To do so will require an aesthetic orientation to the 
present that is hopeful and reflective and not resentful and calcified. 
A Reconsideration of Kantian Aesthetic Vocabulary for Contemporary Politics  
 As demonstrated in the first chapter, the rhetorical boundaries between feelings or 
sentiments and truth are becoming less distinct. Grossberg addresses this condition as it relates to 
the phenomenon of “fake news,” providing a link between the contemporary moment and Kant’s 
aesthetic vocabulary about determinant and reflective ways of judging. Grossberg writes, “Truth 
itself is becoming a matter of affect! The problem with fake news is not simply that it denies 
Truth, or even that it denies the possibility of judgment, but that it denies the necessity of 
judgment, the link between judgment and credibility.”136 There is a sense that our feelings are 
self-evidently correct, are the very ground where truth is. If sentiment is self-referential, meaning 
that there are no underlying or contributing factors to its existence, then it appears as intuitively 
right. When this intuition contributes to authoritarian politics, it seems that reflection upon this 
intuition is needed to potentially revise such feelings. From a belief in feelings as self-evident, 
there is no possible judgment “underneath” or within taste, feeling, or affect. Therefore, there is 
no credible or meaningful possibility of reflective judgment upon our feelings–they are the 
beginning, middle, and end of the truth.  
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Resentful civic habits, tastes, and feelings are made possible, maintained, and reinforced 
through the (over-) exercise of what Kant calls determinant judgment–the way of judging that 
merely applies its universal premise regardless of the particular context.137 Using the Las Vegas 
shooting as an example again, a determinant judgment about the shooting would take one’s pre-
judgment, (e.g. that, in general, assault weapons should or should not be banned), and apply that 
thinking to this particular situation. This would mean that proponents or opponents of an assault 
weapon ban would see this situation as an example proving that they have been and are already 
“right” about this issue. 
Admittedly, determinant judgment is a necessary way of judging for some contexts. We 
cannot “reinvent the wheel” of society at every moment and live a healthily ordered life. Some 
determinant judgment is required politically; not every single political situation can be decided 
“from scratch.” Nevertheless, with the rise of a paranoid style and its accompanying calcified 
convictions that threaten healthy democratic discourse, one must challenge this calcification to 
resist the rise of authoritarian politics. Civic habits discourage meaningful habits of reflection, as 
everything we already believe is merely confirmed.  
If there is any hope of challenging these calcified convictions, I argue in the next chapter 
that a more reflective way of judging needs to be cultivated and taken up. Following Kant, a 
reflective way of judging primarily engages the particular; the particular is not merely subsumed 
underneath a pre-given universal conviction.138 One’s general convictions are suspended or 
bracketed in reflective judgment; universal sentiments do not dictate how one feels about a given 
situation or happening. Moreover, using Rice’s language, reflective judgments require the 
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“porousness” to particular experiences so as to reconsider one’s general sentiments and 
convictions. In other words, this way of judging allows for particulars to “have their say” in 
general convictions.  
Letting particulars have their say through reflective judgment opens the possibility for 
tastes to change. Through reflective judgment, there is a chance for one’s feelings about a 
particular situation and one’s related general convictions to come into conflict. If the particular 
situation is taken seriously enough, this opening can prompt a reassessment of one’s general 
conviction. Reflective openings can change one’s general sentiments; appreciating the richness 
of particulars can dissolve hardened desires. Admittedly, there is no guarantee that a reflective 
way of judging will change general convictions. Upon reassessing a general conviction, one may 
reaffirm one’s preexisting conviction. Nevertheless, encouraging reflective judgment in taste, 
feelings, and conviction seems to offer a better chance of addressing the resilience of far-right 
politics. Recalling Rice, this is because practicing reflective judging tries to encourage and create 
the conditions for openness, rather than merely presupposing it.139  
In the case of the Las Vegas shooting example, a reflective way of judging would not 
allow one’s preformed general conviction, (e.g. that, in general, assault weapons should or 
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should not be banned), to dictate their sentiments and perception of this particular situation. 
One’s general stance on the desirability of regulating firearms would be open to input from the 
tragic character of what occurred in Las Vegas. This would mean that proponents or opponents 
of an assault weapon ban would not only see this situation as an example to subsume underneath 
their general conviction; they might come to see they have been “wrong” about this issue. This 
space provides the chance that they will feel differently about the regulation of firearms in this 
particular instance than they generally do. Such cleavage between feelings about gun control for 
the particular happening of the Las Vegas shooting (e.g. that laissez-faire gun laws contributed to 
this tragedy) and in general (e.g. that laissez-faire gun laws generally do not contribute to gun 
violence) can allow for the general conviction to change.   
With resentful and paranoid politics, then, it seems there is no habit or desire to 
reflectively judge, no lamenting of the “loss” of this potentially critical faculty, For those hoping 
to challenge, reorient, or put into question resentful feelings and authoritarian tastes, it seems the 
only course is to take up the difficult but necessary task of cultivating reflective habits in how 












CULTIVATING A PREJUDICE FOR REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT:  
IMAGINING AN AESTHETIC ORIENTATION TO RHETORIC 
 TO CONTEST THE FAR RIGHT  
The preceding chapters provide a better sense of why far-right rhetoric appears resilient 
against a predominant strain of rationalist-deliberative rhetoric, and also of the attractiveness of 
far-right, reactionary resentment. Because of this, it is unwise to keep adhering to a rational-
deliberative style of rhetoric in response to the far right and expect different or better results. 
Lawrence Grossberg describes this need for novelty by writing, “We need to offer something 
other than the stories we have been telling for decades, which have, in case you have not noticed, 
largely failed.”140 If this is the case, the place of the imagination, creativity, and reflective 
thinking seem to be essential to offer new narratives to confront, counter, and hopefully improve 
our political, economic, and socio-cultural practices. To conjure up new stories, new affective 
landscapes, new directions for sensus communis aestheticus, I argue an aesthetic openness must 
be present. New stories need to be listened to if they really are to be taken up. Sedimented tastes, 
desires, and feelings need to be weakened if new ones are to be considered. This is to say that 
flexibility and willingness to consider what is at least initially distasteful, undesirable, and 
uncomfortable is indispensable for novelty.  
Therefore, I argue for cultivating a prejudice for reflective judgment to encourage 
aesthetic porousness. The openness that comes with reflection would challenge the 
overdetermined, closed judgment of the far right. To do so, I explain the need for reflective 
judgment to be a cultural prejudice (“pre-judgment”), habit, or general attitude. Paradoxically, 
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for reflective judgment to have some staying power, especially against overdetermined 
judgment, it requires a determinant judgment that understands the meaningful consideration of 
particular experiences to be necessary and desirable. Then, I imagine a theoretical approach to 
cultivating this habit of judgment through “rich particulars,” i.e. happenings that resist being 
subsumed by overdetermination and that “lend themselves” to reflective judging, exemplars that 
encourage reflective judgment as a way of judging, and shaping what I call the “feeling of 
feeling” to reorient people’s more immediate and intuitive sentiments through their judgment 
about the initial feeling.  
Before sketching some key aspects of such an orientation, it is worthwhile to take a 
moment to understand the weight of the contemporary situation; specifically, the potential 
withering away of the very creative aspects of culture that offer the chance for something 
different to emerge. Grossberg presents this scenario: “How do we imagine the present as a field 
of actualities and possibilities? What if it is the imagination itself that is in jeopardy? 
Imagination dead; imagine. Is this the fascism of our age!”141 Imagining this unimaginable, yet 
possible future is profoundly disturbing. The vitality and vital character of the imagination is 
difficult to overstate. As I discuss below, the imagination is essential to meaningful reflection 
and therefore to the manifestation of different stories and worlds. It is key to the recognition of 
what is, is not-yet, and perhaps even what is yet-to-be. Imagining the death of the democratic 
imagination is frightening because it relies upon the very faculty it foretells as dead to bring forth 
this image. We are prompted to envision a world that could no longer be envisioned if it came to 
be. Irrespective of the possibility of such an occurrence, I hope to work against this image by 
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advocating for an aesthetic orientation to rhetoric that cultivates a prejudice for reflective 
judgment.  
Reflective Judgment as a Form of Porousness 
The key, I believe, to an aesthetic orientation to rhetoric that could contest the far right is 
what I describe as a cultivation of a prejudice for reflective judgment. This style of judgment, 
when brought to bear in the face of new or different particular experiences, can decalcify 
overdetermined and instantaneous, or “knee-jerk,” ways of judging. Such decalcification would 
replace, or encourage reflection on, judgments that are common sensical to present tastes, in 
these of being seemingly obvious or self-evident.  
Reflection here is not sought as an end in itself. Rather, reflection is sought as a means 
for making judgments, more precisely for reflective judging, in the practical sphere of decision-
making. Such a mode of judging would not necessarily reject one’s initial judgments or 
prejudices (pre-judgments). It will also not guarantee a “correct” decision after a period of 
reflection. Even if truly open to the particularity of the context, reflection is still not a recipe to 
“get it right.” While reflection cannot produce perfect judgment, this way of judging can allow 
for better judgment because it respects the importance of particulars for informing ethical, 
aesthetic and epistemic phenomena. Even in the case when reflective judging confirms our 
prejudgments, this way of judging better guards us against confirmation bias by allowing us to 
more thoroughly consider diverse, even contradictory sentiments and convictions.  
Given this, reflection, or more specifically a way of judging that delays final judgment 
until after consideration of the particular context, can produce more nuanced or rich judgments. 
To contest the habituated, calcified rhetorical taste of far-right politics, the case for a more 
reflective form of judging is that democracy is only healthy when other tastes, ideas, and 
 
 90 
practices can prompt changes in the perception and sentiments of a people. By not challenging 
the hardened convictions of the far right “head on,” but instead by targeting the firmness of felt 
conviction itself, the cultivation of a more reflection regarding the significance of events in 
political rhetoric has the potential to restore some measure of democratic discourse. For example, 
after the Las Vegas shooting, country artists Josh Abbott and Caleb Keeter expressed a reversal 
of their feelings and position on gun control.142 In a twitter post, Keeter writes, “I’ve been a 
proponent of the 2nd amendment my entire life. Until the events of last night. I cannot express 
how wrong I was. We actually have members of our crew with [Concealed Handgun Licenses], 
and legal firearms on the bus . . . They were useless.”143 Here, Keeter describes his general 
feelings on gun control changing because of this particular happening. In other words, the 
visceral quality of this event appears to compel Keeter to reassess and ultimately change his view 
on this issue. Yet, it seems fair to say that if Keeter were not on the scene of this tragedy, that his 
position on this issue would be less likely to change. That is, if he had not experienced this 
shooting “first-hand,” his relationship to this the general policy position would probably remain 
the same. This is because he has tended to oppose gun regulations his “entire life.”  
Because of this claimed life-long habit, it took experiencing an extraordinary event first-
hand (which unfortunately seems to have become increasingly ordinary) to prompt reflection on 
his previous position to ultimately change it. Accordingly, reflective judgment need not take an 
onerous period of time, spanning months, years, or decades before a decision is made and action 
is taken. Instead, following Kant, it refers to the form of judging that works from or starts with 
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the particulars (e.g. the Las Vegas shooting) and works toward universals, decision, and action 
(e.g. general stance on gun control). A Kantian notion of determinant judgment that would start 
with, for example, a pre-determined stance on gun control policy, and then just apply it to the 
how to feel about the Las Vegas shooting. But as seen in this instance of reflective judgment, 
judging can be “instantaneous” though still reflective.  Because reflection can be intuitive, it is 
important to develop said reflection as kind of habit.  
Reflective Judgment as a Aesthetico-Political Prejudice and Habit 
Some might object to the prejudicial character of reflective judgment that I am 
advancing. They may argue that if reflection, which appears to be contrary to the overdetermined 
or “reflex-like” way of judging, is to be made a prejudice that it could not be authentically 
reflective. This is to say that one might object that authentic reflection requires an absence of 
prejudicial judgment. Everyone and everything would need to be open to reevaluation to be truly 
reflective.  
Further, it may be raised as an objection that by being prejudicial, a cultivated prejudice 
for reflective judgment would undermine its call for reflection by ceding ground to a particular 
form of prejudice, thus being “self-contradictory.” Even if a prejudice or habit for reflective 
judgment purports to work against calcified tastes, feelings, and sentiments, by encouraging a 
habitual or non-reflective tendency for reflection, it is doomed to fail because such a prejudice is 
at war with itself. It will not ultimately undermine habitual ways of judging because it still relies 
upon habit to prompt and maintain reflective judgment. 
While these objections observe a logic of consistency, they underestimate the importance 
of habits, unreflective practices, or “rules of thumb” in producing sustained modes of human 
behavior. Additionally, the pre-givenness of sensus communis necessarily provides an orientation 
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for the rhythms and routines. We cannot be without sensus communis, meaning socio-cultural 
thumbnails or inclinations. Because of this, there is no possibility of a space outside of some 
prejudices or, in common parlance, of “no judgment.”  There are tendencies toward what we are 
open to and closed off from, to what attracts and repels us. Consequently, rather than taking on 
the dubious task of trying to rid people of all prejudices, cultivating better prejudices seems to be 
more feasible. A prejudice toward reflective judgment would have the advantage of being 
habitually intuitive while being open to different tastes and sentiments. Put differently, 
inculcating a communal taste for reflection would mean that one would socially inherit or 
develop it as a predisposition. A part of the reason for the staying power of far-right convictions 
seems to be its prejudicial character. Perhaps ironically then, shifting the power of prejudice 
toward reflection could cultivate this practice toward more democratic ends. From a prejudice for 
reflective judgment, the only thing “overdetermined” is that one can be confident only after 
consideration of particulars, yet never certain to the point of fundamentalism.   
Particulars to Principles: Imagining the Cultivation of Habits for Reflective Judgment 
How could such a prejudice for reflective judgment be cultivated? With the concept of a 
prejudice for reflective judgment in mind, it is necessary to seek the conditions for the possibility 
of cultivating such a prejudice so that it may be better understood how to go about encouraging 
its growth. If particular kinds of judgments and actions of the far right are deemed socially 
unethical, not to mention dangerous, by democratic standards and if these judgments are difficult 
to change due to the unreflective stance that supports making them, then it seems necessary to 
understand how one might encourage a counter-prejudice, reflective judgment that could 
ultimately supports an open culture of judgment embracing diverse tastes. Again, because 
reflective judgment need not occur over an extended period of time, it can and should apply 
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equally to epiphanies and to more gradual changes. In both cases, the change in the way of 
judging is key, in the movement from particulars to principles rather than the other way around.  
Accordingly, any given particular, like the Las Vegas shooting, should trigger reflective 
judgment rather than rote conviction. Here, Keeter's remarks are instructive; he experienced first-
hand the “useless[ness]” of the legal firearms available in deterring and responding to the mass-
shooting. Recalling his change of heart, the massacre could not be reconciled with his life-long 
view, so he felt compelled to change his position. It is important to note here the power of the 
human ability to reconcile most happenings with already established feelings about almost 
anyone or anything in the world. This is to say that it is often more comfortable to find ways to 
maintain present tastes and ways of being than to change them in the face of contradictions. 
From the strength of the human faculty to maintain beliefs against change, we can gather that the 
character of this particular happening was powerful enough to challenge Keeter’s general 
feelings toward and conception of this issue. Moreover, it was powerful enough to overcome any 
propensity to rationalize or subsume most particular happenings underneath his general feelings. 
Why? When all other efforts, arguments, and conventional discourse had failed to prompt a 
reconsideration, let alone persuasion, what was different about this situation that made change 
possible?  
To answer this, Abbott’s remarks on Twitter are helpful. He writes on twitter, “I’ll never 
unhear those gunshots; and our band and crew will never forget how that moment made them 
feel. Our hearts are with all the victims.”144 In this post, Abbott does not refer to lofty principles 
that are cognitively deduced to come to a conclusion on what his attitude should be–he hears and 
feels the suffering of others. Colloquially, his heart rather than his head motivates his judgment. 
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Feeling drives change. The direct experiencing of this event provides an image that is moving. 
This reorients his relation to this issue. Abbott’s memory, made possible through the imagination 
of the past, attempts to (re)create this image so that it can be communicated with others who 
have not directly experienced the shooting. Still, in being communicated, this recreation can 
never be, nor would we want it to be, a literal representation of the event as it occurred for 
Abbott. We have no choice but to get this “second-hand” from Abbott’s account.  
Consequently, while it is moving that Abbott and Keeter have seemed to genuinely 
reflect on this situation from within the situation, the first-hand experiencing of violence to alter 
attitudes would be difficult to, not to mention undesirable to, “scale up.” More generally, we 
cannot exclusively rely upon weighty first-hand experiences that appear to compel us to reflect. 
It is morally repugnant to wait until most people have experienced gun violence or sufficiently 
compelling events to only then correct misjudgment. If we wait for this, it will likely be too late 
to take the appropriate actions. There would not be enough maneuverability to affect the 
conditions that contribute to so much violence if we wait until it becomes obvious to most people 
that a particular judgment on gun control is correct. More important, the trauma and cost in life is 
unacceptable. To wait for certainty before action, assuming this is even possible, is to wait too 
long to respond, not just to gun violence but to many of the complex decisions that we as a 
nation need to be make.     
Following this, it is clear that the “best case scenario” would have creative and vibrant 
imaginations bringing forth answers to tragedies before they occur and thereby preventing them 
from happening, or at least mitigating their harm. While this may not always be possible, 
nevertheless, a cultivation of the imagination in ways of judging could allow the actual 
happening of tragedies to act more powerfully as prompts for reflection, and thus encourage 
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prevention of future tragedies and better mitigation of future harm. Put differently, if we 
acknowledge that painful and preventable catastrophes are going to occur, then it is not enough 
to simply assume that people’s common sense will generate responsible judgments when faced 
with the nauseating character of future catastrophes and, then, lead to appropriate remedies. As 
demonstrated in the first chapter, those hoping to enact change in the wake of tragedy cannot 
presuppose that everyone shares the same common sense, nor will such common sense 
necessarily prompt solidarity toward common ends.  
To prevent tragedies from being “for nothing” or remaining insufficiently addressed, we 
need to encourage a way of judging that can change what its judgments are when considering 
tragedies like the Las Vegas shooting, such that when events display themselves as abhorrent 
enough to prompt action, it is possible to imagine (and desire) a future in which they do not 
occur. We need to be able to imagine events in a visceral way so that we can feel the desire to 
live differently, so that we may act differently. As a result, it is essential to encourage people to 
enlarge their capacity of feeling in relation to making judgments. For this, creativity is necessary 
for both the attempts to prompt feeling and for the ability to be affected by something. This is 
because the ability to feel something about events, especially when not directly experienced, 
requires the (re)creation of something about those events to prompt feeling.   
 As suggested by Grossberg’s notion of cultural affective landscapes, because the issues 
faced politically are necessarily collective rather than individualistic, the creative ability to feel 
that Diane Davis calls affectability, cannot take place simply on an individual level if it is to have 
a societal effect.145 Consequently, it is necessary for this to be a political and cultural project and 
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not only a set of individualized projects.  Above all, enlivening the exercise of creative potential 
is essential; crafting projects that depend on sensus communis and that excite the collective 
imagination and that make this excitement appealing, can help us better feel and thereby 
reflectively judge the particularity of the present so that we may work toward a different future. 
Still, despite the need to encourage reflection-at-a-distance, it is hard to deny the power of first-
hand happenings to prompt reflection, offer the chance to alter tastes and attitudes, and 
potentially excite action. Therefore, for rhetorical projects aiming to prompt reflective judgment, 
it is a matter of understanding why first-hand experience can prompt reflection so powerfully 
and of creating a variety of ways to work with this force. We need to craft rhetoric that invites 
audiences to imagine as if they were experiencing particular events, real or hypothetical, so as to 
prompt reflection and to reorient feelings about cultural and political issues. In the history of 
rhetoric, there are many well-documented ways to excite a reflective imagination responsive to 
the needs of the context, including amplification, reversal, and imitation.    
Judging Rich Particulars, Exemplars, and the Feeling of the Feeling for Reflective 
Attitudes 
To help us understand how we can prompt reflective judgment and to understand the 
similarities and differences between the first-hand experience and potentially motivational 
second-hand images, the Kanto-Arendtian description of the imagination is helpful. Arendt in her 
Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy describes the imagination as “The faculty of making 
present what is absent.”146 From this description, we may gather that the imagination is 
responsible for presenting us with a representation of what is not immediately at hand—it 
provides an image that we can sense (feel) as much as we can understand (think). By being 
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fostering communication, or serving as an “intermediary” for both our particular feelings and our 
general attitudes, the terrain of the imagination seems to offer a unique place to manifest and 
potentially instill different ways of feeling and understanding about the act of judging itself. 
Accordingly, this imagination is essential to (re)producing images that strengthen our connection 
with the particulars of the context and that prompt reflective judgment.   
Before going further in regard to imagination, however, we must confront an issue of 
“cause and effect.” To recognize and create rich particulars that can spark reflective judgment 
already presupposes the ability of our imaginations to appreciate particular happenings beyond 
the mere confirmation of our present inclinations. In other words, imagination is required to 
make present particulars richly enough so that we can reflectively judge them and not 
immediately subsume them under general tendencies of judgment. Reciprocally, atrophied 
imaginations would have trouble appreciating the rich particulars that could encourage the 
practice of reflective judgment. All shootings become the same shooting, which supports the 
same feeling about shootings, for instance. A case in point is the routine, near instantaneously 
made claim that any school shooting is a “false flag” operation meant to discredit gun owners 
and the National Rifle Association. In essence, the project of cultivating a prejudice for reflective 
judgment intertwines the rhetorical promise of rich particulars or exemplars with the potential of 
the imagination to break habituated judgments of right-wing “common sense.” Both exemplars 
and imagination are necessary but not sufficient, and each presupposes the other.   
Therefore, if either the imagination or the appreciation of particulars in their particularity 
is absent, then one has a vicious cycle of aesthetics and rhetoric, in which the sensus communis 
protects hardened desires, takes pleasure in judgment being habitual and closed, and relishes a 
political rhetoric of bullshit. There could not be a desire for reflective judgment without an 
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attraction to the wealth of living particulars by way of an inventive imagination. Yet, there does 
not seem to be an absence of the imagination and appreciation of living particulars, i.e. the 
possibility for reflective judgment, as much as an atrophy (in the normative/ethical sense). These 
are either latent qualities, dormant in their exercise, primarily applied to spheres “outside” the 
political culture, or they are employed only in limited ways regarding our tastes within political 
culture. The latent potential of using the imagination to explore different futures through the 
particularities of experience is displayed most clearly through the fact that tastes have actually 
changed.  
Since there must be something that motivates a change of taste for such change to occur, 
the challenge is to create contact with rich particulars or exemplars that can excite the 
imagination to imagine differently. Here, we have at least two ways forward with regard to how 
we may encourage particular tastes (and distastes) and, at least as importantly, cultivate 
particular ways of tasting. Regarding the richness of particular events, in their richness certain 
particulars can resist the ability of individuals to subsume them underneath their general tastes 
even when there is a tendency toward generalized, habituated evaluation. In other words, 
something about the quality of some events can disrupt the immediacy and comfort of making 
calcified judgments about them. For example, the Parkland High School and Charleston Church 
shootings are nuanced enough to resist attempts to merely incorporate them into and underneath 
people’s general views of gun policy and far-right politics. These happenings invite “new” 
feelings, suggest different ways of feeling and orientations to feeling, and can prompt people to 
feel differently about our feelings themselves. Such a disruption is precisely the ground of 
reflective judgment, wherein one acts as if they need to work from the “bottom-up” to evaluate 
rather than the “top-down,” which only preserves preexisting attitudes.  
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The rhetoric of exemplars is key regarding the use of rich particulars to challenge present 
sentiments. Kant goes as far to refer to examples as “the go-cart of judgments.”147 Left rhetorical 
projects challenging far-right politics can craft exemplars that encourage the reflective mode of 
judgment itself as a general comportment, reflex, or prejudice. Arendt elaborates on the idea of 
the exemplar in Kant: “The example is the particular that contains in itself, or at least is supposed 
to contain, a concept or a general rule.”148 If we contrast exemplars with the idea of rich 
particulars more generally, while rich particulars may be crafted to prompt reflective judgment 
for a particular issue (e.g. gun control), exemplars may be understood as a specific subset of 
particulars that imply or orient us to a more general attitude. For this project, this may be 
interpreted as suggesting that an exemplar has the quality of being a particular that also suggests 
something that applies beyond the confines of its particularity. Certain situations lend them 
themselves to opening up our thinking beyond the case in point. It follows that employing 
effective examples can be a rhetorical approach to cultivating the general attitude or 
predisposition toward reflective judgment as an approach to taste. In essence, exemplars are 
particulars that point beyond the immediacies of their particularity without abandoning the 
richness that makes them valuable and effective. Thus, exemplars, through the richness of their 
particularity, can serve as a model for disrupting a calcified taste for closed, far-right discourses 
while simultaneously cultivating a predisposition toward the general concept or rule of reflective 
judgment.  
As in the above example of Abbott and Keeter reflectively judging based on their direct 
experience, rhetorical actors can imagine and create exemplars to serve as a model for cultivating 
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a prejudice for reflective judgment as a general way of judging. Arendt describes the use of 
examples as an approach to understanding: 
One may encounter or think of some table that one judges to be the best possible  
table and take this as the example of how all tables actually should be: the  
exemplary table (“example” comes from eximere, “to single out some  
particular”). This exemplar is and remains a particular that in its very  
particularity reveals the generality that otherwise could not be defined. [For  
instance,] courage is like Achilles.149  
Rather than provide an abstract definition, providing a model that orients someone toward a 
generality can more effectively contest preconceived notions. Abstraction is too easily fortified 
against; living exemplars can remain tied to specific events while suggesting or implying 
generality. Instead of remaining in the general and abstract, where only present attitudes tend to 
be considered, examples provide the opportunity to imagine a general principle through intuition 
of the particular. Finally, examples can offer a taste of the reflective process before it has become 
habituated; they resemble the act of imagining the standpoint of others by imagining the general 
from the particular. In that sense, exemplars can serve as a predecessor to the critical process of 
reflection upon a variety of particulars to come to decision. These examples can be attractive or 
unattractive to audiences, depending on the context, so that they can be communicable to the 
given audience depending on their existing tastes, attitudes, and approaches to judgment. In other 
words, rather than abstractly “preaching” the virtues of reflective judgment as a habit of taste, 
rhetoricians can model the attractiveness of such habits through the grasp-ability of examples. 
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Through careful display of the process of reflection regarding particulars, there is the possibility 
of bypassing overly rigid resistance to certain tastes by cultivating openness to (re)consideration.   
From this consideration of rich particulars to encourage particular feelings and tastes, and 
exemplars to cultivate general attitudes, I turn to explore how such encouragement and 
cultivation might occur through different “levels” of feelings. Here, Arendt’s explanation of the 
potential difference of taste and reflection upon is instructive. She writes, “It is called taste 
because . . . it chooses. But this choice is itself subject to still another choice: one can approve or 
disapprove of the very fact of pleasing: this too is subject to approbation or disapprobation.”150 
By this, we can distinguish the immediate or “reactive” judgment of taste informed by our habits 
and the more reflective judgment upon our judgment. These need not always align. Kant 
provides the example of the “sorrow of a widow at the death of her excellent husband” such that 
“a deep grief may satisfy the person experiencing it.”151 In this example, the reactive feeling of 
the death of a loved one is displeasing, but the reflection upon this feeling, i.e. the feeling of the 
feeling, may be gratifying. This means that the reflection upon the feeling and the feeling itself 
need not align in whether they are pleasing. Feelings please or displease in multiple registers of 
feeling.  
For this project, this means that there are at least two approaches to confronting existing 
unethical tastes at the aesthetic level. First, the rich particulars manifested for particular 
audiences can work to prompt pleasurable or displeasurable feelings surrounding a particular 
issue. As discussed above, the Parkland High School shooting can serve as a rich particular that 
can prompt feelings of disgust surrounding the tragic consequences of existing gun policies in 
                                               




the United States. These aim at producing an “initial” feeling of approbation or disapprobation 
by associating attractive or repulsive particulars to a given issue. By focusing on tastes 
surrounding a given issue, one would try to prompt reflective judgment as a way of being 
political and rhetorical within the particular scope of tastes surrounding matters like gun control, 
climate change, and healthcare policy.  
However, this approach has its limits. For one, when an unreflective approach to 
judgment is predominant, rich particulars need to help encourage the actualization of a reflective 
form of judgment in addition to prompting certain feelings. If reevaluation is to occur, the 
pleasurable or displeasurable particular feelings need to be “linked up” with a general stance 
toward rendering judgments. This is because the reactive taste is insufficient if it does not court 
reconsideration. For example, if someone deems laissez faire gun policy to be preferable, disgust 
about the Parkland shooting is insufficient if this disgust does not motivate reflection, decision, 
and action to change one’s sentiments concerning gun regulation. Additionally, rich particulars 
only tend to associate feelings toward reflection concerning a particular issue. The feeling of 
disgust about the Parkland shooting may prompt reflection about this issue, even just this 
shooting, but not necessarily cultivate a prejudice for reflective judgment as a specific taste in the 
exercise human intentionality. Therefore, while this is an important approach to prompting 
reflection, its gains in prompting reflection may not inculcate a habit of reflection to be 
applicable across contexts. 
Realizing that new stories may fail is part of the challenge–that they may not sufficiently 
orient us to tackle the problems we face or counter the comforting and compelling narratives for 
the status quo or reactionary tales. No outcome is assured. Nonetheless, there is greater risk in 
not attempting to weaken the taste for paranoid bullshit among the far right–the maintenance of 
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the “same” is already disastrous and only risks further catastrophic practices. By not addressing 
the roots of resentment, i.e. democratic dissatisfaction (regardless of its virtuousness), we do not 
speak to the conditions that make far-right stories and practices possible. If this root of 
resentment is insufficiently addressed, then there seems to be little reason to believe that it will 
resolve itself or “get better” over time. For resentment to be, there must be some failure that, if is 
left to its own devices, will tend to perpetuate itself. Some may point to underlying economic 
dissatisfaction, to ideology or worldview, and others to longstanding institutions of racism and 
sexism. Regardless of whatever is designated as the “chief cause,” assuming such a move is 
accurate, maintaining our more comfortable, rational-deliberative style of rhetorically engaging 
this resentment seems naïve at best. Such efforts have proved incapable of hindering feelings of 
resentment (and prove themselves incapable daily), and have failed to reorient resentment toward 
more ethical ends. Reorienting rhetoric that resists far-right discourse around taste and sensus 
communis aestheticus is a risk worth taking if we are to actualize more democratic and ethical 
ways of living together. It is counter-intuitive, but using the tools of deliberative reason are 
incapable of maintaining a culture of deliberative reason. Rebuilding a taste for reflection is 
necessary for deliberative reason to flourish.   
This is the promise that I believe an aesthetic orientation to rhetoric geared toward 
cultivating a prejudice for reflective judgment can aid. We need an orientation that meaningfully 
takes into account our ways of perceiving, tasting, and judging the world so that we may 
perceive, taste, and judge differently, and perhaps better. Only if we orient ourselves toward 
futures that take up what Grossberg refers to as strategic and diagnostic challenges in addition to 





HOW DO FASCISTS DREAM? OR ON THE LIMITS OF REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT  
 In recognition of the limits and risks of the approach advocated in this project, it is 
incumbent on me in conclusion to consider the precarious nature of reflection. Presupposing that 
reflective judgment is an ontological possibility, and that a genuine openness to particulars can 
de-calcify our present tastes, it is important to ask where is reflection presently being directed? 
Further, why has this been (and is) insufficient in addressing the need for tastes to change to 
motivate changing ways of living in common? In other words, why has reflective judgment 
failed to protect us against the rise of neo-fascism? Moreover, how might this way of judging 
actually aid contemporary far-right projects? 
 To begin provisionally, the common and banal character of catastrophically unethical 
practices can serve as an example of where democratic reflection’s atrophy or impotence serves 
fascist ends. Here I examine Adolf Eichmann, one of the infamous men responsible for carrying 
out the so-called final solution (i.e. the extermination of millions of Jews, Roma peoples, 
homosexuals, and other “undesirables”). To consider the limits of reflective judgment to weaken 
the sedimentation of resentment, I look to this infamous case of a person seemingly absent of 
reflective and imaginative capacities (or at least not exercising these capacities). Indeed, Arendt 
famously condemns Eichmann not for being malevolently evil, but instead for a banality of 
evil—“ordinary,” human badness with extraordinary consequences.  
 Crucially, rather than lacking reflective judgment, Eichmann seems to display a fascistic 
style of reflection. As I illustrate below, he takes up what he feels are relevant particulars to 
inform his convictions and practices. Therefore, I argue that cultivating a prejudice for a 
democratic style of reflective judgment needs to foster a greater quality and range of particulars, 
 
 105 
and the openness to change one's ways of being from this process; it does not have to resurrect a 
destroyed faculty. At least at present, though fascist reflective judgment predominantly considers 
particulars that do not threaten convictions, and is therefore atrophied from a democratic point of 
view, there is still reflection that is minimally amenable to democratic politics and can develop 
within neo-fascist politics. This potentiality for development of democratic reflection, 
imagination, and taste from their existing fascistic counterparts is a key terrain for contesting the 
far right on the grounds of sensus communis aestheticus. If even Eichmann, the figure par 
excellence who is purported to be without reflection displays atrophied, though nonetheless 
present moments of reflection that might have been cultivated under different conditions, then it 
is safe to say that Left opponents of the far right can cultivate better reflective judging toward 
democratic taste, ethics, and politics.  
 At first glance, this example may seem extreme. Someone so unreflective can appear to 
be exceptional; surely the case of Eichmann cannot apply to the more general problem of 
insufficient reflective judgment with regard to taste and thought. Yet, the extreme character of 
this bureaucrat of genocide provides a nearly “absolute zero” case for the place of this way to 
judge in an apparently unreflective individual. It makes clearer the character of a fascistic style 
of reflection that appears from a democratic point of view as unreflective. Eichmann’s apparent 
“lack” of reflection provides insights into what fascistic reflection looks like and how such 
reflection might sustain these practices and make them resilient. In other words, because his 
character is so obviously unreflective, he provides a glimpse of the way far-right politics engages 
in reflective judgment. Therefore, this individual instance can provide some traits to be 
considered at a more widespread cultural level.  
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 In what follows, I look to the story of Eichmann and Kommerzialrat Storfer, one of the 
leaders of the Viennese Jewish community during the period, to display a different way to reflect 
and imagine that reinforces fascistic proclivities. Rather than a simple lack or absence in the 
exercise of these faculties, I argue that a sliver of empathy contributed to the certainty of 
Eichmann’s convictions and practices, not weakened them. Through this story, I suggest the 
uncomfortable proposition many individuals are susceptible to far-right styles of reflective 
judgment and imagination from contemporary culture. Then, drawing upon Jacques Ranciere, I 
argue that this shallowness of reflection has an aesthetic register; particular categories of people 
do not appear as proper political subjects to Eichmann, the National Socialist regime, and the 
contemporary far right.152 Far-right sensus communis does not view Others as suitable to imagine 
and reflect upon, in such a way that Others’ particularity might challenge far-right hardened 
desires and convictions. Finally, I conclude by revisiting Grossberg’s statement about imagining 
the death of the imagination and call for the Left to contest this aesthetic terrain and not cede it to 
the far right. 
 Arendt in her Eichmann in Jerusalem describes his fatal character flaw as “his almost 
total inability ever to look at anything from the other fellow’s point of view.”153 To some extent, 
this description fits with the interpretation offered in the previous chapter. Following Arendt’s 
description, Eichmann was either incapable or had no desire to reflect upon the particulars of the 
situation that did not already confirm his present self. Further, he could not imagine or chose not 
to imagine what it was like for the people he was initially responsible for overseeing the 
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deportation, and later the deaths of. Finally, his stance was the antithesis of a broadmindedness 
(epistemological) and capacity for empathy (aesthetic/affect) that an imaginative and reflective 
orientation to judgment would hopefully produce. He did not feel the suffering of those he 
condemned. Or, at the very least, he did not feel the suffering enough to do anything meaningful 
to impede, mitigate, or prevent the Shoah (Holocaust), even within the confines of his role.  
 Yet, it is too simplistic to consider Eichmann, or neo-fascists generally, as devoid of the 
capacity and ability to exercise reflective judgment, imagination from the standpoint of others, 
and a feeling for broadmindedness and empathy. One episode about Eichmann’s encounter with 
Kommerzialrat Storfer, one of the leaders of the Viennese Jewish community during the period, 
displays Eichmann’s somewhat active, though severely atrophied ability to imagine and feel for 
another. Since Eichmann had been placed in Vienna in 1938 to help administrate the 
“emigration” (i.e. expulsion) of Jews, he felt it was worthwhile to investigate Storfer’s situation 
after being informed that Storfer had been sent to Auschwitz. He felt this way because they 
personally worked together in Vienna and because Eichmann believed Storfer had “always 
behaved well.”154  
 After consulting the chief of the secret police of Vienna, Eichmann was told, “No one 
could get out once he was in. Nothing could be done.” Rather than stopping at this news, he met 
with Storfer and Auschwitz Commandant Höss to see how he could “resolve” the situation. 
Eichmann described this meeting with Storfer as “a normal, human encounter.”155 He even 
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displayed a limited degree of empathy with Storfer, telling him, “Well, my dear old friend [Ja, 
mein lieber guter Storfer] . . . we certainly got it! What rotten luck!”156 
 Upon communicating to Storfer that he could not get him out of the camp because of his 
orders, Storfer asks if he may be exempted from work. Once again, Eichmann is informed by 
Höss that Storfer cannot be relieved from work duties because “everyone works here.”157 
Immediately accepting this statement, Eichmann imagines a “solution,” displaying some 
creativity, by simultaneously fulfilling the demand that “everyone at Auschwitz works (and/or 
dies),” and still responding to Storfer’s deep dissatisfaction with his work. Eichmann decides that 
Storfer will only have to “keep the gravel paths in order with a broom” and be provided a bench 
to occasionally sit upon. This is deemed acceptable to both Höss and Storfer.  
 In retrospect, most chillingly, Eichmann describes his reflection upon the encounter with 
Storfer—“It was a great inner joy to me that I could at least see the man with whom I had 
worked for so many long years, and that we could speak with each other.”158 From this encounter 
with someone different from him, he feels pleasure at his ability to reflect within his bounds 
toward judgment and the decision to help Storfer. In this limited instance, he displays some 
empathy for this individual and makes efforts to mitigate his suffering. (Though not alleviating 
the suffering or the administration of the deaths of millions of other individuals). Perhaps 
astonishingly, Eichmann revels in the ability to speak with this individual in a “normal human 
encounter.” While clearly exceptional and limited, Eichmann still displays a level of reflection. 
However, this reflection is only applied in a minor change in the fate of Storfer. Arendt writes, 
“six weeks after this normal human encounter, Storfer was dead–not gassed, apparently, but 
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shot.” Eichmann’s imagination was not imaginative enough to change the fate of Storfer, nor his 
reflection reflective enough to connect this particular case with a challenge to the larger system 
of extermination.  
 Relatedly, another vignette displays Eichmann’s ability for remorse for particular Jewish 
individuals, without that remorse translating into changes in general convictions. Arendt notes:  
It was not murder but, as it turned out, that he had once slapped the face of Dr. Josef 
Löwenherz, head of the Vienna Jewish community, who later became one of his favorite 
Jews. He apologized in front of his staff at the time, but this incident kept bothering 
him.159 
That Eichmann could feel remorse and the need to take corrective action for this individual Jew, 
yet feel nothing, and even retrospectively a “sense of elation,” suggests the nauseating, yet 
nonetheless present capacity for empathy.    
 From these examples, one can see how a minor moment of reflection may have helped 
contribute to the continuation of genocide, and, more specifically the attitudes that help make 
fascistic sentiments possible. However, this should not be interpreted to say that we should not 
engage in reflective judgment, or that this way of judging necessarily serves to reinforce rather 
than challenge unethical thinking, feeling, and acting in the world from the point of view of 
democratic ethics. Rather, this example displays that reflective judgment, imagination, creativity, 
broadmindedness, and empathy in regard to particular cases are insufficient (even if necessary) 
to being ethical. One can be reflective, imaginative, and broadminded and still be unethical. For 
the above example, Auschwitz was, at once, the failure of the promise of the imagination for 
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democratic ethics and the actualization of creativity applied to totalitarian practice (fascistic 
sentiment imaginatively intended toward repugnant ethics). 
 Eichmann’s infinitesimal moment of reflection served to reinforce, rather than challenge, 
his practices and attitudes. Arendt describes this brief reflective moment as follows; “Eichmann 
needed only to recall the past in order to feel assured that he was not lying and that he was not 
deceiving himself, for he and the world he lived in had once been in perfect harmony.”160 These 
“forays” into reflective judgment and their infinitesimal impact on changing the outcome of 
decision-making helped reinforce the feeling that Eichmann was living a virtuous life. The sense 
of being able to speak in a “normal, human way” helped restore his confidence in his practices, 
rather than challenging them. His feeble attempts at broadmindedness, such as reading the 
Zionist classic The Jewish State, learning Hebrew and Yiddish, and reading a Yiddish 
newspaper, likely helped confirm, even inculcate anti-Semitic attitudes and practices.161 Or, the 
feeling of remorse for slapping Löwenherz could have helped maintain Eichmann’s self-
understanding that he was an empathetic individual. Thereby, his self-understanding of being 
empathetic at the micro-level could have contributed to his unempathetic feelings toward the 
genocidal practices he contributed to at the macro-level.  
 Such an affective strategy and shift in the character of reflective judgment upon 
particulars was even considered by Himmler. Contrary to the understanding of an indifference or 
pleasure by the perpetrators of the Holocaust, Arendt notes, “A systematic effort was made to 
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weed out all those who derived physical pleasure from what they did.”162 Instead, the problem of 
affective disgust or revulsion at the destruction of human beings by one’s own hands was 
reoriented; these feelings were “directed toward the self [instead of against the genocidal 
system].”163 Arendt describes how a concentration camp guard or administrator of Zyklon B into 
a gas chamber might work through their revulsion: “Instead of saying: What horrible things I did 
to people!, the murderers would be able to say: What horrible things I had to watch in the 
pursuance of my duties. How heavily the task weighed upon my shoulders.”164 Through this 
strategy, revulsion became a form of attraction. Instead of revulsion undermining genocidal 
practices, one’s disgust demonstrated one’s commitment to duty. This was their individual 
“burden” to fulfill, not cause for condemning the National Socialist regime.  
 To link this affective strategy to a (neo)fascistic way to judge reflectively, I turn to 
Ranciere’s discussion of not seeing Others as political subjects. He writes, “If there is someone 
you do not wish to recognize as a political being, you begin by not seeing them as the bearers of 
politicalness, by not understanding what they say, by not hearing that it is an utterance coming 
out of their mouths.”165 This is not simply ignoring others; to ignore implies that one hears yet 
disregards another. To not even hear an utterance of an Other, for it to be de jure not worth 
understanding or feeling is a qualitatively different phenomenon. This explains why the far right 
refers to immigrants without legal recognition as illegal aliens.  
 When an Other is not seen as a political being, then there is no desire or reason to 
recognize them as a particular that can be judged upon reflectively. Purportedly “unpolitical” 
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beings are not even worthy of being understood as a particular, let alone taken up as such in 
reflective judging. By not being political particulars to inform judging, they cannot be taken up 
in such a way as to challenge or change one’s preexisting convictions (especially when those 
convictions are dogmatically sustained through overdetermined judging). Crucially, if Others 
(e.g. Jews, non-whites, so-called illegal aliens) are not taken up as particulars in reflective 
judgment, then one can still reflectively judge without one’s sentiments ever being meaningfully 
questioned. Even in rare moments of reflective judging, then, a fascistic approach to this way of 
judging is unlikely to challenge preexisting and overdetermined judgments. If anything, fascistic 
engagement with the particulars may help maintain and reinforce overdetermined judging; one 
can “arrive again” at their calcified conviction by not even perceiving anything contrary to such 
a conviction. Thus, like its counterpart in overdetermined judging, fascistic reflective judgment 
almost inevitably cements rather than challenges their convictions.  
 Such failure to even perceive particulars that could prompt democratic reflective 
judgment and imagination is perhaps one of the most dangerous aesthetico-ideological features 
of far-right politics. I interpret Arendt designating this as “thoughtlessness.” She applies this 
designation to Eichmann’s role in the Holocaust, “it was sheer thoughtlessness – something by 
no means identical with stupidity – that predisposed him to become one of the greatest criminals 
of that period.”166 However, following my above interpretations of the Storfer and Löwenherz 
examples, I understand such thoughtlessness as a way of thinking, such lack of empathy as a way 
of empathizing, such atrophy of the imagination as a way of imagining. Contesting this political 
style means making the necessary particulars recognizable as particulars (e.g. undocumented 
                                               




immigrants) as a necessary condition for democratic reflective judgment. Such appreciation of 
specific particulars is not simply the exercising of atrophied imagination and reflective judgment, 
but also the qualitative expansion of the entities worthy of being taken up as a particular. It is at 
once the fostering of new habits as much as an undoing of existing habits. For without these twin 
moves, it seems the dogmatism of fascistic style, even alongside a cultivated prejudice for 
reflective judgment, is too fortified against the appeals of democratic tastes, possibilities, and 
ethics. A chief concern, then, seems to be the evisceration of democratic possibilities from an 
ascendant far right. Far-right habitual resentment erodes the grounds on which it may be 
undermined – mainly through the closing-off of the field of particularity and imagination that can 
sustain democratic practices.  
I conclude by revisiting Grossberg’s speculation, “Imagination dead: imagine. Is this the 
fascism of our age?” But what if instead of far-right politics lacking imagination, their rhetorical 
resilience stems from another way of imagining? In other words, what if their resilience is made 
possible by the power of their sensus communis aestheticus, e.g. attractiveness to so-called 
strong men qua Adorno and feelings of resentment qua Jeremy Engels. Neo-fascists also 
creatively imagine new possibilities and cultivate sympathetic tastes. Fascists dream. This 
aesthetic power must be confronted if democratic politics are to survive. Whether through the 
impotence of the rational-deliberative approach, seemingly bulletproof far-right rhetoric, or self-
perpetuating resentful desires, the dogmatism and calcification of this taste means it cannot be 
tackled "head on." Such direct approaches have failed to foster democratic discourse. It is naïve 
to think they will suddenly start working. 
Aesthetics, the sphere traditionally disassociated from politics, is an indirect path to 
encourage different tastes through cultivating a rich habitual way of reflecting in matters of taste. 
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As Schiller writes, "If [hu]man[s] [are] ever to solve that problem of politics in practice [they] 
will have to approach it through way of the aesthetic."167 Cultivated habits of reflective judgment 
and imagination might foster a desire for democratic politics.  The ascendance of far-right 
aesthetics demonstrates the potential of this sphere for democratic politics; sensus communis 
aestheticus has changed before and therefore can change again. If this is the case, it is all the 
more important for those who hope to contest such imaginings and possibilities to contest this 
ground–to cultivate better aesthetic proclivities through creativity that can spark critical-
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